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only accurate information about themselves, community guidelines that prohibit “coordinated inauthentic 
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This Article critically examines authenticity regulation by the social media industry, including companies’ claims 
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explains how authenticity regulation provides economic value to companies engaged in “information capitalism,” 
“data capitalism,” and “surveillance capitalism.” It also explores how companies’ self-regulatory focus on 
authenticity shapes users’ views about objectionable speech, upends traditional commitments to pseudonymous 
political expression, and encourages collaboration between the State and private companies. The Article concludes 
that “authenticity,” as conceptualized by the industry, is not an important value for users on par with privacy or 
dignity, but that it offers business value to companies.  Authenticity regulation also provides many of the same 
opportunities for viewpoint discrimination as does garden-variety content moderation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 In 2015 and 2016, Russian-linked groups ran paid content on Facebook 
in an effort to influence the U.S. election.1  When Facebook publicly 
acknowledged this in September 2017, the company was careful in its 
framing.  The content of the offending advertisements was not a problem, 
Facebook’s executives explained.2  Rather, the problem was the 
“inauthenticity” of their sources; the Russians were bad actors because they 
had pretended to be someone they were not.3  Sheryl Sandberg, Facebook’s 
Chief Operating Officer, told an interviewer that most of the Russian-linked 
advertisements would have been permitted on Facebook “if they were run 
by legitimate people,” meaning people who presented their true identities.4   
The company’s choice of framing was significant.  When Congress 
enacted laws criminalizing foreign election interference, speaker deception 
was not the problem it sought to address.  Federal law prohibits foreign 
interference regardless of whether the speaker presents a true or false 
identity, on the view that foreign influence distorts the political process even 
when it is undisguised.5  The social media industry, on the other hand, has 
 
 1 See Alex Stamos, An Update on Information Operations on Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 6, 
2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/09/information-operations-update/ (explaining 
how Facebook identified thousands of dollars in advertisements purchased by inauthentic Russian-
linked pages). 
 2 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5 (2017) 
(statement of Colin Stretch, General Counsel, Facebook), available at https://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-31-17%20Stretch%20Testimony.pdf (“The Facebook accounts 
that appeared tied to the IRA violated our policies because they came from a set of coordinated, 
inauthentic accounts.”) [hereinafter Testimony of Colin Stretch]; Elliot Schrage, Hard Questions: 
Russian Ads Delivered to Congress, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Oct. 2, 2017), https://news
room.fb.com/news/2017/10/hard-questions-russian-ads-delivered-to-congress/ (“We require 
authenticity regardless of location.  If Americans conducted a coordinated, inauthentic operation—
as the Russian organization did in this case—we would take their ads down too.  However, many 
of these ads did not violate our content policies.  That means that for most of them, if they had been 
run by authentic individuals, anywhere, they could have remained on the platform.”). 
 3 Alex Stamos, Authenticity Matters: The IRA Has No Place on Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 3, 
2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/authenticity-matters/ (describing the Internet 
Research Agency as a “bad actor[]”). 
 4 Exclusive Interview with Facebook’s Sheryl Sandberg, AXIOS (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.axios.com/
exclusive-interview-with-facebooks-sheryl-sandberg-1513306121-64e900b7-55da-4087-afee-9271
3cbbfa81.html (reiterating points from Elliot Schrage’s earlier blog post); see also Schrage, supra note 
2 (noting Facebook’s talking points in response to the Russia election interference inquiry). 
 5 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2018); See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011) (exclusion 
of foreign citizens from activities of democratic self-government is necessary to preserve “our 
national political community”), aff’d 565 U.S. 1104 (2012); Zephyr Teachout, Extraterritorial 
Electioneering and the Globalization of American Elections, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW 162, 183–187 (2009) 
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long enforced private authenticity rules.  Companies require users to present 
only their “true” selves on social media, and censor “inauthentic” speech.6  
As this Article documents, authenticity enforcement is expanding, with few 
critics.  Over roughly a decade, authenticity has evolved into an important 
“value” used to shape online speech.7  What accounts for the rise of 
authenticity?  The companies argue that authenticity is a quality of personal 
integrity, a cudgel to reduce abusive behavior and crime, and an essential 
component of free expression.  They also suggest that authentic speakers 
produce authentic content.  This Article, which critically examines authenticity 
regulation by private companies, explores additional reasons that are not 
commonly discussed, including that companies engaged in “information 
capitalism,”8 “data capitalism,”9 and “surveillance capitalism”10 derive 
economic value from authenticity regulation.11   
Free-speech jurisprudence recognizes that the State can burden speech 
through many regulatory methods.  One method is content-based regulation, 
in which the State singles out some speech for special treatment, or outlaws 
it altogether, based on the substance of what it communicates.12  Another 
method is speaker-based regulation, in which the State treats speech 
differently based upon who is speaking.13  In either case, a main concern is 
 
(discussing the self-government and sovereignty interests that have traditionally justified a 
prohibition against foreign election interference). 
 6 See infra Part I.B. 
 7 See, e.g., Facebook Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/community
standards/ (discussing the five core “values” that shape Facebook’s regulation of speech: voice, 
authenticity, safety, privacy, and dignity) (last visited Jan. 4, 2020). 
 8 See generally Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 1953 (2018); Julie Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369 (2016). 
 9 Jack M. Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain 3 (Hoover Institution, Aegis Series Paper No. 
1814, 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3266942 
(describing “data capitalism” as “the grand bargain of the Second Gilded Age”). 
 10 SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN 
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 8–9 (2019). 
 11 These terms describe an emerging economy of business transactions in which value is extracted 
from individuals’ data through data analytics.  
 12 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640–643 (1994) (“As a general rule, laws 
that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or 
views expressed are content based.”); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) 
(“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression 
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”). 
 13 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 827 (1995) (“The government 
must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or 
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”).  A third method is compelled speech, 
where the State forces a speaker to make a disclosure.  Other methods exist as well. 
 
May 2020] BAD ACTORS 623 
that the State will misuse its power to burden speech with which it disagrees, 
in order to suppress a particular idea or to manipulate public debate.14   
Although the First Amendment does not apply to private social media 
companies, these “New Governors” of speech15 regulate public discourse 
online, where they employ the same speech-regulating methods used by state 
actors, including content-based measures, speaker-based measures, and even 
mandatory disclosures.  Academic study of social media companies’ speech 
regulation has created a rich literature on content moderation, but has been 
slow to examine other regulatory methods.16  This Article starts from the 
proposition that authenticity rules constitute a form of speaker-based speech 
regulation, because they treat “authentic” speakers differently from 
“inauthentic” speakers.17   
The social media network is the first significant speech forum in which a 
single “curator” controls both the production and receipt of speech by 
individual participants, determining simultaneously and continuously what 
each participant is allowed to say and to whom, and what speech each 
participant is allowed to receive, and how.  Even this description fails to 
capture the full speech-regulating power of the social media user interface, 
which can be designed to up-rank or down-rank speech relative to other 
speech, to “push” messages across devices, to repeat messages or deliver them 
at a particular moment, to make some content more visually engaging than 
 
 14 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Speech restrictions based on the identity 
of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.”); Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 
641 (“Government action that stifles speech on account of its message,” i.e., content-based 
regulation, poses “the inherent risk that the Government seeks . . . to suppress unpopular ideas or 
information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”). 
 15 See generally Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018) (describing the increasing role and responsibility of private online 
platforms in free speech and democratic culture). 
 16 See generally id.; Evelyn Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
26 (2018); Thomas E. Kadri & Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan: Public Figures and Newsworthiness in 
Online Speech, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 37 (2019); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 
GEO. L.J. 1353 (2018).  Separate literature has looked at problems relating to privacy and 
discrimination in the use of artificial intelligence, including situations in which artificial intelligence 
shapes speech and debate on social media.  See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age 
of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. Rev. 54, 59 (2019) (“An algorithm can instantly lead to massive 
discrimination between groups.”); Olivier Sylvain, Discriminatory Designs on User Data, KNIGHT FIRST 
AMEND. INST. (Apr. 1, 2018), http://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-
data. 
 17 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (finding speaker-based discrimination occurs when “restrictions 
distinguish[] among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others”). 
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others, and to exploit a limitless set of behavioral insights18 designed to 
influence the recipient’s response to the message.  Social media companies 
like Facebook and Twitter monetize this technological capability by 
marrying it with a constant inflow of user-specific data that works ceaselessly 
to identify, distinguish and quantify people for the purpose of determining 
their speaking and listening prerogatives, and for fixing the fees the 
companies will charge speakers. 
The social media network is not the “marketplace of ideas” imagined by 
twentieth-century visionaries, in which demand for the best ideas causes 
them to rise to the top.19  In the social media exchange, speech is “served” to 
a group of recipients based upon the amount the speaker is willing (or able) 
to pay and the recipients’ identifying characteristics and behavior.  At profit-
seeking social media companies, the relationship of these factors is expressed 
in the form of a proprietary algorithm that has a purpose to maximize 
payments to a third party: the social media company.   
It was a short leap from authenticity enforcement to identity-verification 
requirements for speakers.  After experimenting with verification for public 
figures for years, in 2017, Facebook rolled out a system of speech licensing 
for any user who wants to discuss “national issues of public importance” with 
the use of its paid tools.20  Introduced as a solution to political advertisement 
transparency problems, the new rules required speakers to send the company 
an image of his or her U.S. passport or driver’s license so that Facebook could 
verify the speaker’s identity.21  Verification threatens to exclude certain kinds 
of people from participation in public discourse online, such as low-income 
and undocumented individuals.  The Washington Post found that verification 
requirements have placed extra burdens on speech that touches on LGBTQ 
issues, because Facebook has treated all LGBTQ-related content as political 
speech.22  Facebook has deployed verification selectively: for a time, under 
 
 18 See, e.g., Ricardo Baeza-Yates, Bias on the Web, 61 COMMS. ACM 54, 59 (2018) (describing “position 
bias,” in which content that appears in the top left corner of a screen receives a more significant 
audience response). 
 19 See Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media: A Layer-Conscious Approach, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
193, 217 (2018) (“That process of truth-finding through truth-testing,” captured by the marketplace 
of ideas metaphor, “bears little resemblance to the algorithmic sorting that creates winners and 
losers in social media’s attention sweepstakes.”). 
 20 See Ads About Social Issues, Elections or Politics, FACEBOOK AD HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com
/business/help/214754279118974 (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).  
 21 See generally id. 
 22 See infra Part I.C. 
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its rules, “poverty” was a political issue requiring speakers to verify their 
identities, but “wealth” was not.23   
At Twitter, only verified accounts are eligible for exemptions from the 
company’s content rules on “public interest” grounds.24  And speakers who 
violate Twitter’s content rules have had their identity verification—their blue 
check mark—rescinded as punishment.25 
Companies also employ product features that capitalize on users’ “true” 
identities.  Facebook has marketed “Town Hall” features that allow elected 
officials to communicate with tailored audiences comprised only of 
individuals identified by Facebook as living within the official’s area of 
representation.26  For example, the feature has allowed elected officials to 
host virtual town halls on Facebook Live, attended only by verified 
constituents.27  These features not only limit who can speak and listen to 
elected officials, but also which journalists can report on those 
communications.  They purport to define the group of individuals who are 
authentic constituents of an elected official.28   
Social media companies originally characterized authentic identity as a 
status, but have re-characterized it over time to include behavior.29  Both 
Facebook and Twitter prohibit something they call “coordinated inauthentic 
behavior.”30  Under this behavioral approach, authentic speakers can violate 
a company’s authenticity rules by behaving in inauthentic ways or by 
associating with “bad actors.”  This shift, which has led companies to use 
 
 23 See Ads About Social Issues, Elections or Politics, FACEBOOK AD HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com
/business/help/214754279118974 (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).  
 24 See infra Part I.C. 
 25 See infra Part II.E. 
 26 Griffin Connolly, Facebook Features Connect Lawmakers with Constituents, ROLL CALL (June 8, 2017), 
https://www.rollcall.com/politics/facebook-features-connect-lawmakers-constituents.  
 27 See Faine Greenwood, A Civics Lesson for Facebook, SLATE (Aug. 8, 2017), 
https://slate.com/technology/2017/08/facebook-now-offers-constituent-services-what-could-go-
wrong.html (explaining how Facebook’s “Town Hall” project, which included the constituent 
badge feature, also introduced “district targeting,” which allows elected officials to create posts and 
polls that are visible only to confirmed constituents, and “constituent insights,” which provides 
elected officials with tools to view and comment on news stories that are popular among their 
constituents). 
 28 In doing so, they operationalize the company’s view on the politically contested issue of who is a 
“constituent” of an elected official.  See infra Part I.F.  See generally Richard Briffault, Of Constituents 
and Contributors, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 29 (2015) (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’s endorsement 
of “contributor representation” in McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014)). 
 29 Shoshana Zuboff has argued that the ultimate purpose of surveillance capitalism is to shape or 
manipulate individuals’ behavior.  See generally ZUBOFF, supra note 10; see also Balkin, supra note 9 
(noting how the digital age “exacerbates the twentieth-century problem of manipulation”). 
 30 See discussion infra Part II.B.4. 
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machine learning to proactively flag and punish problematic associations, 
potentially burdens individuals’ freedom of association, both online and in 
the real world.  In at least one recent case, Facebook identified “coordinated 
inauthentic behavior” where political liberals, operating under their real 
names, ran a Page called “Conservative Alabama Politics” that sought to 
influence conservative voters.31  The speakers did not misrepresent their 
identities, but their effort to address a conservative audience was treated as 
inauthentic behavior because they were not genuinely conservative.  Twitter has 
been charged with erroneously sweeping up “real” speakers in purges of 
networks accused of coordinated inauthentic activity.32   
Many proposed solutions to social media speech-harms are designed to 
address concerns about content moderation and privacy, while leaving in 
place the authenticity rules and practices that give value to data analytics.  
For example, commentators have called for expansions of the “state actor” 
doctrine to make it harder for technology companies to engage in content 
moderation,33 for the treatment of social media companies as “public 
utilities,”34 or for tougher new privacy laws.35  None of these proposals 
addresses authenticity regulation, continuing a trend in which commentators 
and scholars tend not to recognize authenticity policing as a form of speech 
regulation.   
Facebook itself has convened an independent body—a sort of private 
supreme court—to oversee its content moderation.36  The Charter for its 
 
 31 See infra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 116–18 and accompanying text. 
 33 See, e.g., Colby M. Everett, Free Speech on Privately-Owned Fora: A Discussion on Speech Freedoms and Policy 
for Social Media, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 115 (2018) (“[T]his article argues social media are 
public fora regulated by quasi-governmental actors seeking to filter certain speech.”); Benjamin F. 
Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in the Age of Facebook, 44 N.M. L. REV. 121, 121–22 (2014) 
(arguing courts should “deem censorial acts by social network websites to be state action under the 
public function exception to the state action doctrine”).  But see Jack M. Balkin, supra note 9 
(opposing this proposed solution, noting that “social media sites might want to require that end 
users use their real names or easily identifiable pseudonyms in order to limit trolling and abuse”). 
 34 See generally Adam D. Thierer, The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities, 21 COMM. 
L. CONSPECTUS 2 (2013) (discussing the possibility of conferring public utility status on major social 
media platforms). 
 35 Jack Balkin has proposed that social media companies and other online service providers be treated 
as “information fiduciaries” toward customers and other end-users.  Jack M. Balkin, Information 
Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1186 (2016). 
 36 See Brent Harris, Establishing Structure and Governance for an Independent Oversight Board, FACEBOOK 
NEWSROOM (Sept. 17, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/09/oversight-board-
structure/  (describing and evaluating the proposal for Facebook’s “Supreme Court”); Thomas E. 
Kadri & Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan: Building Constitutional Law for Online Speech, 93 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 37, 74–80 (2019). 
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Oversight Board mentions authenticity once, characterizing it as a potential 
limitation on free expression, rather than as purely beneficial for speech.37  The 
company’s policy documents present authenticity as one of five values—the 
others are voice, safety, privacy, and dignity—that the Oversight Board will 
use “to inform its decisions” on content.38 
The Article proceeds in two parts.  Part I describes how authenticity 
regulation has evolved in the social media industry, with an emphasis on 
exploring authenticity as a business value.  Relying mainly on the example 
of Facebook, it reviews the advertisement-based business model, with its 
reliance on micro-targeting and customization, and shows how authenticity 
rules underwrite the surveillance-capitalism business model.  As it shows, 
both authenticity policies and identity-verification systems have deepened 
and expanded in the wake of the Russian-interference scandal, but neither 
was created in response to that scandal.  Rather, these practices continue 
long-standing strategies that tend to enhance the industry’s profit-generating 
activities.   
Companies’ authenticity policies make it possible for them to quantify 
users, to offer paying customers a reliable count of the people who receive 
their advertisements, and  to offer investors a measure of the company’s user 
base, growth, and future cash flows.  They also allow companies to ensure 
the integrity of their user-specific data, which is critical for machine learning.  
In order for companies’ data systems to “learn” patterns of human behavior, 
they must have accurate data inputs.  Thus, a Facebook user who 
misrepresents his age to Facebook corrupts the company’s machine learning, 
because the system will attribute all of his behaviors to a younger (or older) 
person and glean false insights about human behavior from that attribution. 
Part II assesses authenticity as a core social media value.  Companies 
have variously described authenticity as a moral virtue, a pragmatic 
necessity, an essential component of “meaningful” speech, and a limit on free 
expression.  They claim that forcing users to present their “true” identities 
cuts down on harassment and other speech harms.  They contend that 
authenticity-based takedowns are necessary to prevent fraud and other 
crimes, and to nurture trust in online communications.  And they commonly 
 
 37 See FACEBOOK, OVERSIGHT BOARD CHARTER 2 (2019), available at 
https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf [hereinafter 
OVERSIGHT BOARD CHARTER]; see also infra notes 186–91 and accompanying text. 
 38 See generally MARK ZUCKERBERG, FACEBOOK’S COMMITMENT TO THE OVERSIGHT BOARD 
(2019), available at https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/letter-from-mark-zucker
berg-on-oversight-board-charter.pdf (describing the policy and decision behind creating an 
Oversight Board to support the right to free expression). 
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elide the difference between authentic identity and authentic content, suggesting 
that people who present only true information about themselves produce 
authentic (i.e., good) speech. 
Part II argues that truthful presentation of self can have salutary effects on 
certain kinds of online expression, functioning as a sort of proxy for truth.  
However, it argues that authenticity in the industry sense is not a value on par 
with human rights like privacy and dignity.  Part II explores a number of 
reasons to be concerned about authenticity regulation.  By conflating “false 
identity” with “anonymous identity,” it undermines American free speech 
values that have traditionally protected pseudonymous speakers and 
anonymous political speech.  Authenticity regulation conveys the value 
judgment that when speech is objectionable, it is because of the identity of 
the person speaking, and not because of the content of the speech.  This value 
judgment differs from traditional notions of free speech, which acknowledge 
that some kinds of speech are both objectionable and protected from 
censorship.  The evidence of a connection between authenticity and abuse is 
mixed; some recent research has found that speakers operating under their 
real names are more likely to behave abusively.39   
When they act as arbiters of authenticity, social media companies enjoy 
the same power to suppress viewpoints and manipulate debate as they would 
if they were regulating content.  By making “authentic” identity a valuable 
commodity, companies encourage identity theft, because a stolen identity 
can be harder to detect as false.  In doing so, they encourage an arms-race 
between technology companies and sophisticated identity thieves, including 
foreign nation-states.  This not only increases the value of identity-
verification services, creating profit opportunities for the same technology 
companies that contributed to the problem, but pushes companies to form 
reciprocal relationships with law enforcement.  On balance, authenticity 
regulation may make us worse off, providing little “value” for all of our 
cooperation.   
I.  THE BUSINESS OF AUTHENTICITY 
Facebook’s authenticity rules trace their origin to the company’s earliest 
days, in 2004, when a young Mark Zuckerberg conceived its real-name 
 
 39 See infra Part II.A.3.   
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policy.40  David Kirkpatrick, who interviewed Zuckerberg for his 2010 book, 
wrote that Facebook’s real-name policy emerged from Zuckerberg’s own 
“strength of conviction” that the transparency of the Internet required 
participants to present only one, true self.41  “Having two identities for 
yourself,” Zuckerberg told Kirkpatrick at the time, “is an example of a lack 
of integrity.”42  Today, Facebook’s rules on authentic identity are found in 
its Community Standards under the heading “Authenticity and Integrity,” 
underscoring not only the company’s presentation of identity as an issue of 
user morality, but also the continuing influence of Zuckerberg—the 
company’s controlling shareholder, Chief Executive Officer, and board 
chair—on Facebook’s approach to speech regulation.43   
Facebook sells advertisements, and this requires it to have accurate 
metrics about who is viewing advertisements on its network.  Thus, one 
purpose of Facebook’s authenticity rules is to make the quantification of 
advertisement recipients easy and accurate: users are forbidden from sharing 
accounts and human users are carefully distinguished from organizational 
users through Facebook’s profile/Page distinction.  In addition, Facebook’s 
advertisement-based business model relies heavily on micro-targeting 
through data analytics, and this requires the company to maintain a detailed, 
accurate profile on each user.  Facebook’s authenticity rules facilitate the 
 
 40 DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT 31 (2010); Tom Huddleston, Jr., Here’s How 19-
year-old Mark Zuckerberg Described ‘The Facebook’ in His First TV interview, CNBC (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/16/how-mark-zuckerberg-described-the-facebook-in-his-first-
tv-interview.html.  The orwellian term “authentic identity” did not become part of Facebook’s 
rulebook—its Community Standards—until 2015.  See Tarleton Gillespie, Facebook’s Improved 
“Community Standards” Still Can’t Resolve the Central Paradox, SOCIAL MEDIA COLLECTIVE (Mar. 18, 
2015), https://socialmediacollective.org/2015/03/18/facebooks-improved-community-standard
s-still-cant-resolve-the-central-paradox/ (discussing the shift in standards for requiring users to 
portray themselves accurately). 
 41 Kirkpatrick described Zuckerberg repeating “You have one identity” three times in a single minute 
in a 2009 interview and attributed to Zuckerberg both a “moralistic[]” and a “pragmatic” belief 
that users must present only their true identity on the platform. DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE 
FACEBOOK EFFECT 199–200 (2010).  
 42 This undated quote was attributed to Zuckerberg in David Kirkpatrick’s 2010 book, The Facebook 
Effect.  Id. at 199.  See infra note 196 and accompanying text for further discussion of why 
Zuckerberg might have felt moral zeal for identity policing, in light of recent social psychology 
research. 
 43 Facebook also sometimes asserts that its real-name policy leads to better user behavior.  Recent 
research has called this conventional wisdom into question.  See infra Part III.A.3.  As danah boyd 
observed in 2012, “[m]any people claim people are better behaved and more honest when their 
identifying information is available.  While there is no data that convincingly supports or refutes 
this, it is important to note that both Facebook and face-to-face settings continue to be rife with 
meanness and cruelty.” danah boyd, The Politics of Real Names, 55 COMMS. ACM 29, 30 (2012). 
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company’s gathering of accurate, identifying information about each user, 
which can be matched to user-specific information from other, commercial 
sources.44  For example, under the company’s Terms of Service, users 
expressly agree to provide only “accurate” information about themselves to 
Facebook.45  
Facebook’s authenticity regulation has expanded far beyond the original 
real-name policy and today involves at least four parts: a set of 
authentic/inauthentic identity rules and practices, which determine who is 
allowed to use Facebook’s network—i.e., who is able to produce and receive 
speech; an identity-verification system, which allows or requires certain 
speakers to verify their identities with the company by submitting evidence 
of identity, such as copies of government identification documents; 
advertisement-customization tools, which allow speakers, for a fee, to target 
their speech to listeners based upon the listeners’ identifying characteristics 
and behavior; and specific product features that add value to the user 
experience by curating discourse based upon users’ identifying characteristics 
and behavior.  Many other social media companies employ some or all of 
these practices.   
The integration of authenticity regulation into our existing political 
system has gone virtually unnoticed.  For example, when Mark Zuckerberg 
testified about data privacy to two congressional committees in April 2018, 
all ninety-eight lawmakers on those committees had personal, verified 
Facebook Pages.46  The fact that Zuckerberg was speaking only to lawmakers 
who had acquiesced in his company’s authenticity regulation and were using 
it for their own benefit calls the lawmakers’ independence into question, but 
few commentators have raised concerns.  
Facebook’s authenticity regulation continues to evolve in important ways.  
In the summer of 2017, company executives began publicizing the term “bad 
actor” to describe individuals and organizations whose speech the company 
“unpublishes,” or bans on the basis of “inauthentic identity.”47  Since then, 
 
 44 See danah boyd, The Politics of Real Names, 55 COMMS. ACM 29, 30 (2012). 
 45 Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
 46 Robin Opsahl, Many Lawmakers Questioning Zuckerberg Used Facebook in Their Political Campaigns, ROLL 
CALL (Apr. 10, 2018, 5:02 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/facebook-advertising-
allows-micro-targeted-ads-cambridge-analytica. 
 47 Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (June 22, 2017, 1:25 PM), https://www.facebook.com/
zuck/posts/10154944663901634 (“[W]e’re going to help you remove bad actors and their content 
quickly . . . .”).  Another practice is “shadow banning,” which Twitter defines as “deliberately 
making someone’s content undiscoverable to everyone except the person who posted it, 
unbeknownst to the original poster.”  Vijaya Gadde & Kayvon Beykpour, Setting the Record Straight 
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company executives have consistently maintained that “bad actors” are 
responsible for speech-harms on Facebook and are appropriate targets for 
censorship.  The company’s executives have referred to “bad actors” as 
Facebook’s “adversaries,” and have widely touted their close collaboration 
with American law enforcement to rout out and silence “bad actors.”48  The 
term “bad actor” is now used by many companies to villainize those who 
violate authenticity rules.   
In addition, the social media industry has shifted from characterizing 
inauthentic identity as a status to characterizing it as a behavior.  After the 
Russian-influence scandal broke, Facebook began expressly prohibiting 
something it calls “coordinated inauthentic behavior.”49  Over time, other 
companies, including Twitter, have picked up both the term and the 
enforcement practices it describes, leading to industry-wide behavioral 
policing under the authenticity label.   
Yet speaker-based regulation presents business risks to the companies 
that employ it: it puts downward pressure on a key business metric, Monthly 
Active Users (“MAUs”).  Both Facebook and Twitter disclose their MAUs in 
their securities filings, and investors consider them important to 
understanding each company’s financial performance; high and rising 
MAUs indicate strong financial prospects.  The removal of user accounts for 
“inauthentic identity” lowers MAUs, depressing this key metric.50  Starting 
with its 2016 annual report, and coinciding with a period in which Facebook 
ramped up its removal of “bad actors,” Facebook has steadily increased its 
estimates of inauthentic accounts as a proportion of MAUs—from 
approximately 7% of MAUs at the end of 2016 to its most recent estimate of 
 
on Shadow Banning, TWITTER BLOG (July 26, 2018), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/
topics/company/2018/Setting-the-record-straight-on-shadow-banning.html.  It is not clear 
whether any social media networks actually employ shadow banning; Twitter has denied doing so.  
Id. 
 48 Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 1–2 (2018) (testimony of Sheryl Sandberg, 
Chief Operating Officer, Facebook), available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/os-ssandberg-090518.pdf [hereinafter Tesitmony of Sheryl Sandberg].  
 49 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Explained, FACEBOOK (Dec. 6, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/
2018/12/inside-feed-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior; see also infra Part I.B.4. 
 50 See FACEBOOK, 2018 FORM 10-K, at 4, available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1326801/000132680119000009/fb-12312018x10k.htm (noting that Facebook may 
take actions “to reduce the number of duplicate or false accounts among our users, which may also 
reduce our . . . MAU estimates”); Viyaha Gadde, Confidence in Follower Counts, TWITTER BLOG (July 
11, 2018), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2018/Confidence-in-Follower-Cou
nts.html (“[S]ome accounts we remove . . . have the potential to impact publicly reported metrics”).  
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16% of MAUs at the end of 201951—revealing a risk that its use of speaker-
based strategies could affect its stock price and cost of capital.  This conflict 
makes it potentially useful for Facebook, or any similarly situated company, 
to employ content-based and speaker-based forms of speech regulation 
strategically in offsetting ways.   
This Part starts by explaining the customization-based business model, 
and the reliance of the business model, and the model’s key metrics, on 
companies’ authenticity rules.  Next, it reviews authentic-identity policies 
and identity verification, which is essentially a system of speech licensing.  
Finally, it explores the back-office customization system known as micro-
targeting, which regulates the flow of information to recipients through 
micro-targeting, and an assortment of unique product features that 
companies use to curate discourse by connecting speakers and listeners on 
the basis of identity.   
A.  The Business Model: Customization & Analytics 
Facebook’s revenue model relies almost exclusively on the sale of 
advertising.52  Importantly, “advertising” on social media is not limited to 
traditional advertising—communications designed to market products and 
services—but includes any speech that receives enhanced distribution for a 
fee.  On Facebook, for example, a user can pay to “boost” posts, increasing 
the distribution of his or her speech to friends and strangers.53  When 
 
 51 See FACEBOOK, 2019 FORM 10-K, at 4, available at http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-
0001326801/45290cc0-656d-4a88-a2f3-147c8de86506.pdf (showing that, in the 4th quarter of 
2019, “duplicate accounts” represented approximately 11% of worldwide MAUs, and “false 
accounts” represented approximately 5%).  
 52 See FACEBOOK, 2016 FORM 10-K, at 5, available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1326801/000132680117000007/fb-12312016x10k.htm (“We generate substantially 
all of our revenue from selling advertising placements to marketers.”); id. at 9 (“For 2016, 2015, and 
2014, advertising accounted for 97%, 95%, and 92%, respectively, of our revenue.”).  Interestingly, 
Mark Zuckerberg has attempted to justify Facebook’s advertising-based business model on public 
interest grounds.  In a March 2018 interview with the New York Times, Zuckerberg observed that to 
“bring the world closer together,” it is necessary to produce a service “that people can afford.”  
Kevin Roose & Sheera Frenkel, Mark Zuckerberg’s Reckoning: ‘This Is a Major Trust Issue’, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/technology/mark-zuckerberg-q-and-
a.html.  “A lot of the people, once you get past the first billion people, can’t afford to pay a lot,” he 
explained.  Id.  “Therefore, having it be free and hav[ing] a business model that is ad-supported 
ends up being really important and aligned [with Facebook’s mission].”  Id.  
 53 See Young Mie Kim et al., The Stealth Media? Groups and Targets Behind Divisive Issue Campaigns on 
Facebook, 35 POL. COMM. 515 (2018) (explaining that “[o]n Facebook . . . a native advertisement 
appears in News Feeds (as a Sponsored Feed, or Promoted Page) . . . that resembles news, videos, 
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Facebook and other social media companies talk about “advertising,” 
readers should understand this term to include forms of paid political speech 
that do not resemble traditional advertising.  The social media industry uses 
the term “organic content” to describe content posted by users that has not 
received any sort of enhanced distribution for a fee.  Importantly, Facebook 
treats paid content (advertising) differently from unpaid (organic) content in 
ways that make paid expression more impactful.54   
Facebook’s advertisement tools have more or less democratized 
advertising on social media.  Not only are they self-service and extremely 
easy to use, but they are cheap, allowing users to pay small amounts to 
communicate nearly anything to a customized audience.  Because of its ease 
of use and low cost, paid political advertising on Facebook is within the 
means of many citizens.  The result is, essentially, an information exchange 
in which the distribution of information is determined by the amount of 
money a speaker is willing (or able) to pay, and the identifying data that 
Facebook can attribute to potential recipients.   
1.  Front-Office Customization 
Facebook utilizes a dual-customization model.  One mode of 
customization is designed to add value to the experience of the retail 
Facebook user—the recipient of speech.  If a recipient demonstrates an 
interest in something, the platform will deliver more of this type of content 
to him or her.55  We might call this “front-office customization,” because it 
is a routine part of the retail user’s experience and is apparent to anyone who 
uses Facebook.  Front-office customization is not unique to Facebook.  
Numerous social media platforms employ front-office customization on the 
 
games, memes, or other non-marketing content embedded among regular posts by social media 
users”). 
 54 As just one example, the company allows users to “snooze” keywords in organic content, but not 
in paid content.  This means that users can designate a word or phrase that they would like filtered 
out of their feeds—Facebook does this by eliminating from the user’s News Feed any post that 
contains the filtered or “snoozed” term—but Facebook will not filter out paid content using the 
word.  For an explanation of this feature, see Josh Constine, Facebook Tests 30-Day Keyword Snoozing 
to Fight Spoilers, Triggers, TECHCRUNCH (June 27, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/
06/27/facebook-keyword-snooze/.  Facebook has a business reason for treating organic and paid 
content differently here—it encourages speakers to express themselves through paid content.  
 55 As Zuckerberg explained in the Wall Street Journal, “based on what pages people like, what they click 
on, and other signals, we create categories—for example, people who like pages about gardening 
and live in Spain—and then charge advertisers to show ads to that category.”  Mark Zuckerberg, 
The Facts About Facebook, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-facts-
about-facebook-11548374613. 
 
634 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:3 
theory that people like it.56  Because people like to receive customized 
information, the thinking goes, companies that employ customization will be 
more likely to attract users, and the platform can turn around and market its 
large user base to advertisers.  In fact, to attract eyeballs, social media 
companies are in a bit of an arms-race to create and deploy the most user-
desired forms of customization.   
2.  Back-Office Customization 
Facebook and other social media companies do not charge users for 
front-office customization, but they earn vast amounts from “micro-
targeting,” or what we might call “back-office customization”—
customization designed to benefit the paying customers, advertisers.  These 
companies provide paying speakers with complex customization tools that 
allow them to target communications to only some recipients.  This is the true 
heart of social media companies’ business models, because it is where 
advertising dollars are earned.   
Back-office customization tools allow paying speakers (advertisers) to 
target their speech at a subset of Facebook recipients, determined by criteria 
chosen by the speaker.57  These tools go well beyond basic demographics, 
such as gender and “ethnic affinity,” to provide extremely granular targeting 
based on, essentially, whatever the speaker (advertiser) demands.58  In his 
 
 56 Interestingly, some evidence suggests this assumption is false.  See, e.g., Joseph Turow & Jay 
Hoofnagle, Mark Zuckerberg’s Delusion of Consumer Consent, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/opinion/zuckerberg-facebook-ads.html (summarizing 
research which found that a “substantial majority” of Americans polled did not want commercial 
advertisements, news or political advertisements “tailored to your interests”).  
 57 See Assurance of Discontinuance at 2, In re Facebook, Inc., No. 18-2-18287-5 SEA (Wash. King 
Cty. Super. Ct. July 24, 2018), available at https://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com
/uploadedfiles/Another/News/Press_Releases/2018_07_23%20AOD.pdf (“[Facebook] operates 
a platform that allows advertisers to create and target advertisements using thousands of options 
based on user interests, including . . . interests in one or more of the following ethnic affinities: 
‘African American (US)’, ‘Asian American (US)’, ‘Hispanic (US-All)’, ‘Hispanic (US-Bilingual)’, 
‘Hispanic (US-Spanish dominant)’, and ‘Hispanic (US-English dominant)’ . . . .”); Caitlin E. 
Jokubaitis, There and Back: Vindicating the Listener’s Interests in Targeted Advertising in the Internet Information 
Economy, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 85, 87 (2018) (“Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn[] sustain 
themselves on a quid pro quo exchange of monetizable user data for a wide array of nominally 
gratuitous services”). 
 58 See, e.g., Testimony of Colin Stretch, supra note 2, at 3 (“Advertisers choose the audience they want 
to reach based on demographics, interests, behaviors, or contact information.”); Balkin, supra note 
9, at 4.  See generally Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA 
L. REV. 54, 56–57 (2019) (discussing Facebook’s use of “ethnic affinity” in its micro-targeting). 
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2018 book, Antisocial Media, Siva Vaidhyanathan described how, for $200, he 
used Facebook’s micro-targeting tools to promote a post about a podcast: 
I chose to focus the campaign on those who had expressed interest in 
psychology and neuroscience.  I limited the ad placement to those who had 
an M.D. or a Ph.D. And I excluded those who were younger than thirty 
years old.  This meant I would only reach about three thousand Facebook 
users.  But they would be the right three thousand Facebook users.  Just for 
fun I also excluded any Facebook user who had expressed an interest in the 
1970s country music singer Crystal Gayle.59   
As this reveals, Facebook’s customization tools not only allow speakers to 
create a customized audience for a particular message based upon the 
recipients’ characteristics, but also allow speakers to exclude people from that 
audience based upon their characteristics.  In Vaidhyanathan’s account, 
Facebook’s advertisement tools allowed him to winnow down his audience 
to three thousand people and then pay to “serve” his message to only those 
individuals, for less than seven cents per person.60   
Facebook’s back-office and front-office customization implements what 
Shoshana Zuboff has called “surveillance capitalism.”61  Zuboff explains that, 
in surveillance capitalism, human experience is claimed as “free raw 
material” by companies that transform it into behavioral analytics and 
predictive technologies.62  “Much of this new work is accomplished under 
the banner of ‘personalization,’” she writes, a “camouflage” for efforts “that 
mine the intimate depths of everyday life” for the benefit of companies, like 
Facebook, that trade in data and data analytics.63  In surveillance capitalism, 
individuals’ data is commoditized and highly valued, traded among 
companies, and processed into machine learning, which can be sold.   
Facebook’s customization is made possible in part by its authenticity 
rules.  Its back-office customization tools are effective, and generate high 
profits, because they leverage information gleaned about Facebook users 
who must use only their “authentic” identities and provide only accurate 
 
 59 SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA 88 (2018). 
 60 In a different part of his book, Vaidhyanathan describes himself as the target of back-office 
customization, rather than its initiator.  After he disclosed his “married” status on Facebook, 
Vaidhyanathan writes, the “advertising spaces on my Facebook page filled up with advertisements 
for services that invited me to contact women for the purpose of having an affair.”  Id. at 56. 
 61 ZUBOFF, supra note 10, at 8–9; see also Balkin, supra note 9, at 2 (“Data collection and analysis allow 
targeted advertising, which allows more efficient advertising campaigns, which allow greater 
revenues.”). 
 62 ZUBOFF, supra note 10, at 8–9. 
 63 Id. at 53 (“Under this new regime, the precise moment at which our needs are met [through 
customization] is also the precise moment at which our lives are plundered for behavioral data, and 
all for the sake of others’ gain.”). 
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information about themselves.  The scope of the information that Facebook 
collects on each user—and perhaps even on non-users—is significant.64  
Moreover, the reach of advertising on Facebook is measurable because the 
company’s authenticity policies ensure that every person has only one 
account; as a result, the company can say with accuracy how many 
individuals receive the advertising it transmits.  Company executives 
expressly link the effectiveness of customization to Facebook’s “real identity” 
approach and have described the “real identity” policy to financial analysts 
as a “significant advantage” that Facebook enjoys over its competitors.65   
While Facebook’s authenticity regulation is the substrate upon which its 
business model is built, its commercial potential extends beyond the sale of 
advertising.  Technology-industry observers have long contended that 
Facebook sees identity itself as a business opportunity.66  Since going public 
in 2012, Facebook has acquired several companies that specialize in 
biometric identity verification technology, suggesting that the company is at 
least leaving open the possibility that it will move into this space.67  In early 
2017, the company launched a feature that provides encrypted recovery 
tokens for other websites—“a way for Facebook to convince users to center 
 
 64 See, e.g., id. at 252 (describing Facebook’s strides in biometrics). 
 65 Conference Call of Facebook Executives on First Quarter 2017 Earnings 24 (May 3, 2017), available 
at https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2017/Q1-'17-Earnings-transcript.pdf 
(recording Sheryl Sandberg statement that: “We think that targeting and measurement are 
significant competitive advantages for us. . . .  We believe that because people are sharing interests 
because people are themselves their real identity on the Facebook platform, we have a significant 
advantage”).  In a 2012 internal Facebook email, Mark Zuckerberg made explicit the connection 
between Facebook’s business prospects and its ability to coax users to share identifying information: 
“Sometimes the best way to enable people to share something is to have a developer build a special 
purpose app or network for that type of content and to make that app social by having Facebook 
plug into it. That may be good for the world, but it’s not good for us unless people also share back 
to Facebook and that content increases the value of our network.”  DealBook Briefing: Inside the Emails 
Facebook Never Thought You’d Read, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/12/06/business/dealbook/facebook-email-data.html. 
 66 See, e.g., Donald Melanson, This is Your Life: Facebook and the Business of Identity, ENGADGET (July 16, 
2013), https://www.engadget.com/2013/07/16/facebook-and-the-business-of-identity (referring 
to Facebook as “your single sign-on internet identity”); Semil Shah, Another Reason Facebook Wants a 
Web of Real Identities: Commerce, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 1, 2011, 4:22 PM), https://techcrunch.com/
2011/08/01/facebook-real-identities-commerce/ (“for networks like Facebook, the game is to 
encourage its users to leverage their real identities online so that Facebook can accelerate its ability 
to power online transactions”). 
 67 See ZUBOFF, supra note 10, at 129, 242–54 (discussing “behavioral surplus capture” in “the real 
world” by companies like Google and Facebook). 
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their online identity around their Facebook profile,” as one writer put it.68  A 
year later, only months before announcing its new identity-verification 
requirements for political speech, Facebook bought start-up Confirm.io, 
known for implementing biometric screening systems.  An article about the 
acquisition in the trade publication TechCrunch suggested that Facebook’s 
ambition is to “serve as your ID card in some situations,” a service for which 
it could likely charge a fee.69  In 2019, Facebook announced its participation 
in the Libra Association, which will launch a cryptocurrency, and its 
development of a new product, the Calibra wallet, for utilizing the Libra 
cryptocurrency.70  These lines of business will capitalize on the company’s 
ability to securely tie cyber cash flows to online identities.   
B.  Authentic Identity Rules 
In their rules, social media companies typically distinguish between 
“authentic” and “inauthentic” users and restrict the flows of speech to and 
from “inauthentic” users.71  A speaker who employs a false name or identity, 
or provides the company with false or misleading information about him or 
herself, is an “inauthentic” speaker.72  Twitter prohibited its users from 
 
 68 Kate Conger, Facebook Challenges Email for Control of Your Online Identity, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 30, 2017, 
12:50 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/30/facebook-challenges-email-for-control-of-your-
online-identity/. 
 69 Josh Constine, Facebook Acquires Biometric ID Verification Startup Confirm.io, TECHCRUNCH, (Jan. 23, 
2018, 4:36 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/23/facebook-confirm-io/.  The same 
journalist, a longtime technology-industry reporter with a focus on Facebook, recently observed 
that “Facebook has become the identity layer for the internet.”  Josh Constine, ‘Facebook Avatars’ is 
Its New Clone of Snapchat’s Bitmoji, TECHCRUNCH (May 7, 2018, 8:20 PM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/07/facebook-avatars/. 
 70 See Coming in 2020: Calibra, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (June 18, 2020), https://newsroom.fb.com/
news/2019/06/coming-in-2020-calibra/; Libra White Paper, LIBRA, https://libra.org/en-
US/white-paper/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2020); Josh Constine, Facebook Announces Libra Cryptocurrency: 
All You Need to Know, TECHCRUNCH (June 18, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://techcrunch.com/
2019/06/18/facebook-libra/. 
 71 See, e.g., Alex Stamos, Authenticity Matters: The IRA Has No Place on Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM 
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/authenticity-matters/ (noting that 
Facebook has “worked hard to establish authenticity as a social norm”); Instagram Community 
Guidelines, INSTAGRAM HELP CTR., https://help.instagram.com/477434105621119 (stating that 
users must “[r]emember to post authentic content”) (last visited Jan. 4, 2020).  Twitter streamlined 
its “Twitter Rules” in June 2019; the new rules include a section entitled “Authenticity,” with sub-
headings on “Platform Manipulation and Spam,” “Election Integrity,” “Impersonation,” and 
“Copyright and Trademark.”  See Twitter Rules, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/
en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).   
 72 As explained more fully below, a user who engages in “inauthentic behavior” can also find him or 
herself subject to speech regulation, as Facebook has been expanding its identity-based rules to 
incorporate behavior as a facet of identity.  See infra Part I.B.4. 
 
638 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:3 
registering or creating “fake and misleading accounts” but did not specifically 
use the word “authenticity” in its “Twitter Rules” until June 2019.73  In 
general, Twitter is more permissive than Facebook about the use of 
pseudonyms and multiple accounts.74  Like other companies, when Facebook 
determines that a speaker is inauthentic, it may shut down the speaker’s 
account, remove the speaker’s speech, and prevent the speaker from 
engaging in future speech activity on its network.75  It may also transmit its 
finding of “inauthentic” identity to other social media companies, which in 
turn censor that speaker.76  Once a user is removed from a platform for 
inauthenticity, that user generally may not return to the platform.77   
Facebook’s policies and rules about “authentic” identity are distilled in 
its terms of service, its Community Standards, and in other documents and 
publications.  Its terms of service lay out the basic contours.78   
 
 73 See Del Harvey, Making Twitter’s Rules Easier to Understand, TWITTER BLOG (June 7, 2019), 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/rules-refresh.html; Twitter Rules, TWITTER 
HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules (last visited Jan. 16, 
2020).  After the revisions, a hyperlink found under the heading “Authenticity,” labeled “Platform 
manipulation and spam” brings up Twitter’s September 2019 “Platform Manipulation and Spam 
Policy,” which prohibits “inauthentic engagements” and “coordinated activity,” and states: “You 
can’t mislead others on Twitter by operating fake accounts.”  Platform Manipulation and Spam Policy, 
TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/platform-manipulation 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2020). 
 74 See Parody, Newsfeed, Commentary and Fan Account Policy, TWITTER HELP CTR., 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/parody-account-policy (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).  
 75 See, e.g., ALEX SCHULTZ & GUY ROSEN, FACEBOOK, UNDERSTANDING THE FACEBOOK 
COMMUNITY STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT REPORT 22 (2018), https://fbnewsroomus.files.word
press.com/2018/05/understanding_the_community_standards_enforcement_report.pdf (“When 
we identify a fake account, we disable it so it’s no longer visible and its owner can’t log in.”). 
 76 See, e.g., Testimony of Colin Stretch, supra note 2, at 7 (“[Facebook is] reaching out to leaders in our 
industry . . . to share information on bad actors . . . [to] make sure they stay off all platforms”); 
Nathaniel Gleicher, How We Work With Our Partners to Combat Information Operations, FACEBOOK 
NEWSROOM (Nov. 13, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/11/last-weeks-takedowns/ 
(“[W]e’ve worked closely with our fellow tech companies . . . to deal with the threats . . . .”); Tony 
Romm & Craig Timberg, Facebook Suspends ‘Inauthentic’ Iranian Accounts that Criticized Trump and Spread 
Divisive Political Messages, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2018, 2:24 PM), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/technology/2018/10/26/facebook-suspends-inauthentic-iranian-accounts-that-criti
cized-trump-spread-divisive-political-messages/ (“Twitter said it had removed a small number of 
accounts based on information Facebook supplied.”). 
 77 See, e.g., Platform Manipulation and Spam Policy, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/
en/rules-and-policies/platform-manipulation (noting that Twitter considers it a “severe violation” 
of its rules when a user “creat[es] accounts to replace or mimic suspended accounts”). 
 78 See Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms (last visited Mar. 26, 2020); see 
also What Names Are Allowed on Facebook?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.face
book.com/help/112146705538576 (last visited Jan. 4, 2020).  For examples involving other social 
media companies, see, e.g., Snap Inc. Terms of Service, SNAP INC., https://www.snap.com/en-
US/terms/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2020) (limiting users to a single account); Community Guidelines, SNAP 
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It is Facebook’s longstanding practice to purge its network of 
“inauthentic” users.79  More than a decade ago, law professor James 
Grimmelman observed that Facebook applied its prohibition against false 
identity “rigorously, almost to the point of absurdity.”80  Facebook allows 
users to report others for employing fake names, which by late 2014 had led 
to “several hundred thousand fake name reports” submitted to the company 
weekly.81   
Facebook’s authenticity policies have been criticized for discriminating 
against certain kinds of identities, including Native Americans whose names 
do not conform to popular conventions,82 and transgender individuals who 
have been accused of employing identity-based deception.83   
The rules have also been criticized by domestic violence survivors and 
members of the LGBTQ community for potentially exposing people to 
harm.84  In October 2015, a coalition of civil society organizations wrote an 
open letter to Facebook asking it to let users employ pseudonyms in situations 
where “using an every day [sic] name would put a user in danger” and to 
 
INC., https://www.snap.com/en-US/community-guidelines (“Don’t pretend to be someone you’re 
not—this includes your friends, celebrities, brands, or other organizations—or attempt to deceive 
people about who you are.”) (last visited Mar. 26, 2020); Policy on Impersonation, YOUTUBE HELP, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801947 (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).  
 79 See, e.g., Barbara Ortutay, A Facebook Identity Crisis: A Familiar Face, But the Name?, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE, May 19, 2009, at P6A (recounting the story of a woman whose profile Facebook 
erroneously removed as fake and noting that “[t]o make sure people can’t set up accounts with fake 
names, the site has a long, constantly updated ‘blacklist’ of names that people can’t use,” including 
names “that sound fake, like Batman, or names tied to current events”); see also infra notes 94–96 
(describing purges of inauthentic accounts from 2016 to present). 
 80 James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1143 (2009). 
 81 Chris Cox, FACEBOOK (Oct. 1, 2014, 2:22 PM), https://www.facebook.com/chris.cox/posts/
10101301777354543. 
 82 See, e.g., Abby Phillip, Online “Authenticity” and How Facebook’s ‘Real Name’ Policy Hurts Native Americans, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/
02/10-online-authenticity-and-how-facebooks-real-name-policy-hurts-native-americans/. 
 83 See, e.g., Brittney McNamara, This Person Says Facebook’s ‘Authentic Name’ Policy is ‘Anti-Trans,’ TEEN 
VOGUE (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/facebook-authentic-name-policy 
(describing the Facebook experience of a non-binary member of the clergy of the United Methodist 
Church).  
 84 See Samantha Allen, How Facebook Exposes Domestic Violence Survivors, DAILY BEAST (May 20, 2015), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-facebook-exposes-domestic-violence-survivors (recounting 
the story of a domestic violence survivor whose account Facebook shut down for using a 
pseudonym; after she complied with Facebook’s requirement to reopen the account under her legal 
name, her abusive ex-husband found her and began harassing her almost immediately, despite 
having been out of touch for 18 years); Reed Albergotti, Facebook Versus the Drag Queens, WALL 
STREET J. (Sept. 12, 2014, 8:44 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/09/12/facebook-versus-
the-sisters-of-perpetual-indulgence/ (“Recently, [Facebook] took aim at performers who use stage 
names instead of legal names in their Facebook profiles, forcing them to use their real identities.”). 
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allow users to confirm their identities “without submitting government ID.”85  
While both groups were concerned that Facebook’s real-name rules could 
put them at risk, the LGBTQ community also argued that its members had 
a right to define their own identities.  Facebook responded by announcing, 
at the end of 2015, that it would begin testing small exceptions to its 
authenticity requirements, but it essentially left its rules intact.86   
More recently, it has become apparent that authenticity requirements 
can put pro-democracy and human rights activists at risk.87  Facebook has 
suggested that it makes case-by-case exceptions for activists.88   
1.  Inauthenticity as a Business Risk 
Social media companies have tended to treat inauthentic user identity as 
a business risk requiring enforcement efforts.  Facebook has consistently 
linked authenticity to two of its major business risks: its ability to maintain its 
brands, and the accuracy of its user metrics.  The company’s securities filings 
since 2012 have warned that Facebook’s brands may be “negatively affected” 
by “users acting under false or inauthentic identities,” presumably because 
 
 85 Open Letter to Facebook About its Real Names Policy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 5, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/document/open-letter-facebook-about-its-real-names-policy. 
 86 See Justin Osofsky & Todd Gage, Community Support FYI: Improving the Names Process on Facebook, 
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Dec. 15, 2015), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/12/community-
support-fyi-improving-the-names-process-on-facebook/ (distinguishing that changes were being 
“tested on a limited basis in the US only”); Eva Galperin & Wafa Ben Hassine, Changes to Facebook’s 
‘Real Names’ Policy Still Don’t Fix the Problem, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 18, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/12/changes-facebooks-real-names-policy-still-dont-fix-prob
lem  (describing Facebook’s response as “rearranging chairs on the Titanic”). 
 87 See, e.g., Chloe Tennant, Russia Charges Activist for a Facebook Post, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 22, 2019, 
1:39 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/22/russia-charges-activist-facebook-post 
(describing how Russian prosecutors filed charges against an activist who posted an infographic 
comparing the prices of items in Russia in 2009 and 2019); Emily Price, Twitter and Human Rights: A 
Complicated Story, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Mar. 26, 2014) https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
blog/twitter-and-human-rights-complicated-story (recounting how a Kuwaiti court sentenced 
Mohammed Eid al-Ajmi to five years in prison for criticizing Kuwait’s Amir in a tweet).  Open 
Democracy reported that Vietnamese activists were denied the use of pseudonyms by Facebook, 
which demanded evidence of their identities and then changed their account names to match their 
legal identification without notifying the activists that it would do so.  See Brett Solomon, What Can 
Social Media Platforms Do For Human Rights?, OPENDEMOCRACY (Oct. 26, 2015) https://www.open
democracy.net/en/what-can-social-media-platforms-do-for-human-rights/ (noting that several 
Vietnamese writers and activists were not allowed to use their pen names on Facebook). 
 88 See, e.g., Alex Stamos, Authenticity Matters: The IRA Has No Place on Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM 
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/authenticity-matters/ (describing 
Facebook’s efforts to remove Pages controlled by the IRA surrounding the 2016 presidential 
election).   
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such users could cause the company reputational harm.89  Facebook’s 
financial reports have also warned investors that “real or perceived 
inaccuracies” in its “user and other metrics” may harm its business, and have 
disclosed information about the numbers of “duplicate accounts” and “false 
accounts” that Facebook believes exist.90  The company’s user metrics shed 
important light on its engagement and growth and are closely followed by 
investors; significant changes in its user metrics have caused stock analysts to 
raise concerns about the company’s prospects.  Facebook’s disclosures of 
business risks related to inauthenticity suggest that Facebook’s business focus 
on the issue has been serious and consistent since its earliest days as a public 
company.   
2.  The 2016 Election and its Aftermath 
In 2017, the American public learned about a significant foreign-state-
sponsored campaign to influence 2016 federal elections, waged on social 
media networks including Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.91  In 
connection with this news, these companies purged the Russian-linked 
accounts; Facebook stated that it had shut down the Russian-linked accounts 
 
 89 See, e.g., FACEBOOK, 2018 FORM 10-K, at 14; FACEBOOK, 2017 FORM 10-K, at 13; FACEBOOK, 
2016 FORM 10-K, at 12; FACEBOOK, 2015 FORM 10-K, at 12; FACEBOOK, 2014 FORM 10-K, at 
15; FACEBOOK, 2013 FORM 10-K, at 18; FACEBOOK, 2012 FORM 10-K, at 21; Annual Reports, 
FACEBOOK INVESTOR RELATIONS, https://investor.fb.com/financials/default.aspx (follow 
hyperlinks to corresponding Form 10-K for each fiscal year) (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). 
 90 Facebook further divides “false accounts” into two subsets: “user-misclassified accounts” and 
“undesirable accounts.”  See supra note 89 (defining the differences between the subsets of false 
accounts in annual reports).  In Facebook’s lexicon, a “duplicate account” is an account “that a 
user maintains in addition to his or her principal account.”  FACEBOOK, 2016 FORM 10-K, at 4, 
available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680117000007/fb-123
12016x10k.htm  A “user-misclassified account” is “where users have created personal profiles for a 
business, organization, or non-human entity such as a pet.”  Id.  An “undesirable account” is a user 
profile “that we determine [is] intended to be used for purposes that violate our terms of service, 
such as spamming.”  Id. 
 91 For details about the interference campaign, see generally, ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, 1 REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2019) [hereinafter The Mueller Report].  Although Facebook did not 
publicly disclose what it knew about Russian-linked accounts on its network until September 2017, 
we know today that Facebook was aware, before the 2016 election, of specific cyber threats from 
“actors with ties to Russia.”  See Testimony of Sheryl Sandberg, supra note 48, at 2.  Sheryl Sandberg 
told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in September 2018 that Facebook had “detected 
and mitigated several threats from actors with ties to Russia” before Election Day in 2016.  Id.  She 
also stated that Facebook “saw some new behavior—namely, the creation of fake personas that 
were then used to seed stolen information to journalists.”  Id. 
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and Pages because “[w]e don’t allow inauthentic accounts on Facebook.”92  
Over subsequent weeks, other Facebook executives reiterated this point; 
Sandberg told an interviewer on camera that Facebook would have 
permitted most of the offending Russian advertisements “if they were run by 
legitimate people.”93  These statements underscored the company’s choice to 
emphasize authenticity harms, rather than substantive harms, when it 
discussed the IRA’s electoral interference.   
Soon afterward, Facebook began a series of well-publicized purges of fake 
accounts.94  Twitter has also made public its purges of fake accounts.95  The 
 
 92 Alex Stamos, An Update on Information Operations at Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 6, 2017), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/09/information-operations-update/.  
 93 Exclusive Interview with Facebook’s Sheryl Sandberg, AXIOS (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.axios.com/
exclusive-interview-with-facebooks-sheryl-sandberg-1513306121-64e900b7-55da-4087-afee-
92713cbbfa81.html.  Sandberg was essentially reiterating points that were made days earlier in a 
Facebook blog post:  
We require authenticity regardless of location.  If Americans conducted a coordinated, 
inauthentic operation—as the Russian organization did in this case—we would take their 
ads down, too.  However, many of these ads did not violate our content policies.  That 
means that for most of them, if they had been run by authentic individuals, anywhere, they 
could have remained on the platform.   
  Elliot Schrage, Hard Questions: Russian Ads Delivered to Congress, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Oct. 2, 
2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/10/hard-questions-russian-ads-delivered-to-congre
ss/. 
 94 In April 2018, Facebook removed “more than 270” Pages and accounts “controlled by the IRA.”  
Alex Stamos, Authenticity Matters: The IRA Has No Place on Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 3, 
2018),  https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/authenticity-matters/ (highlighting the 70 
Facebook accounts, 138 Facebook pages, and 65 Instagram accounts removed for lack of 
authenticity); Testimony of Sheryl Sandberg, supra note 48, at 2.  A few months later, in July, 
Facebook revealed that it had again detected “Bad Actors” on Facebook and Instagram.  Removing 
Bad Actors on Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (July 31, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/
2018/07/removing-bad-actors-on-facebook/; see also Testimony of Sheryl Sandberg, supra note 48, 
at 3 (noting that “whoever set up these accounts went to greater lengths to obscure their true 
identities than the IRA did in 2016”).  As part of this purge, the company removed eight Facebook 
Pages and seventeen Facebook profiles that it said violated its “ban on coordinated inauthentic 
behavior.”  Nathaniel Gleicher, What We’ve Found So Far, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (July 31, 2019), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/07/removing-bad-actors-on-facebook/#what-weve-found.  
In August, Facebook again announced that it had detected an influence campaign and had 
removed content.  Taking Down More Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 
21, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/more-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior/.  
The content in question was found on Facebook and Instagram.  Id.  Facebook also announced that 
it had removed an unspecified number of Pages and accounts that “can be linked to sources that 
the U.S. government has previously identified as Russian military intelligence services.”  Testimony 
of Sheryl Sandberg, supra note 48, at 4. 
 95 See Yoel Roth, Information Operations on Twitter: Principles, Process, and Disclosure, TWITTER BLOG 
(June 13, 2019), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/information-ops-on-twit
ter.html (describing Twitter’s efforts to remove state-backed accounts). 
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purges continue to this day and are commonly disclosed to the public by each 
company in a press release.96   
In 2018, Facebook began publishing a “Community Standards 
Enforcement Report” that included details on its removal of fake accounts 
and spam.97  According to the November 2018 Report, Facebook removed 
694 million fake accounts in the fourth quarter of 2017, 583 million fake 
accounts in the first quarter of 2018, 800 million fake accounts in the second 
quarter of 2018, and 754 million fake accounts in the third quarter of 2018.98  
It’s not clear if these numbers reflect the growth of fake accounts on 
Facebook, or instead improvements by Facebook in its ability to identify and 
remove fake accounts.   
What is clear, however, is that by the end of 2018, Facebook was 
removing more speech for authenticity violations than for content violations.  
In the third quarter of 2019, for example, Facebook “took action on” 91.7 
million items for all content-related violations combined, including “bullying 
and harassment,” “violence and graphic content,” and hate speech.99  
However, in the same quarter, it removed 1.7 billion fake accounts.100  What 
 
 96 As of this writing, the most recent purge of fake accounts by Facebook was reported on March 12, 
2020.  See Nathaniel Gleicher, Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM 
(Mar. 12, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-
behavior-from-russia/.  The most recent purge of fake accounts by Twitter was reported on August 
19, 2019.  See Information Operations Directed at Hong Kong, TWITTER BLOG (Aug. 19, 2019),  
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/information_
operations_directed_at_Hong_Kong.html (recounting Twitter’s efforts to suspend accounts 
originating from mainland China that aimed to sow political discord in Hong Kong). 
 97 A preliminary report was published in May 2018, and a more detailed report in November.  See 
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, DATA SNAPSHOT: FACEBOOK’S COMMUNITY STANDARDS 
ENFORCEMENT REPORT (2018), https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/cser-data-
snapshot-nov2018-1.jpg (showing that Facebook has increasingly taken action against spam posts 
as of November 2018) [hereinafter DATA SNAPSHOT].   
 98 Id. 
 99 See Community Standards Enforcement Report, FACEBOOK, https://transparency.facebook.com/
community-standards-enforcement (last visited Mar. 31, 2020); see also DATA SNAPSHOT, supra note 
97 (showing that, in the “How much content did Facebook take action on?” column, in the third 
quarter of 2018, Facebook “took action on” 62.9 million items for content-related violations, such 
as “adult nudity and sexual activity,” “violence and graphic content,” and hate speech, and 1.985 
billion items in the categories “fake accounts” and “spam”).  Unfortunately, the Report provided 
no information on content removed for “coordinated inauthentic behavior.” 
 100 Community Standards Enforcement Report, FACEBOOK, https://transparency.facebook.com/community
-standards-enforcement#fake-accounts (last visited Mar. 31, 2020).  In fact, the Report’s figures on 
fake accounts and spam appear to reflect takedowns of the whole account, though the Report uses 
the word “item” to describe all types of removed speech.  This could mean that when disclosing 
content-based takedowns, the Report treated a single post containing bad content as an “item,” but 
when disclosing identity-based takedowns, it treated a whole fake account as a single “item.”  In 
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is more, the report provided figures only for some identity-based 
prohibitions—fake accounts and spam—and revealed nothing about other 
types of speech that Facebook has said it removes for authenticity violations, 
such as “coordinated inauthentic behavior.”   
3.  Bad Actors and Bad-Faith Actors 
In the summer of 2017, at a time when Facebook was learning internally 
about the actions of Russian-linked groups,101 company executives began 
popularizing the term “bad actor” to describe individuals and organizations 
whose speech the company “unpublishes” or bans on the basis of 
“inauthentic identity.”102  Since then, company executives consistently have 
maintained that “bad actors” are responsible for harms caused by speech on 
Facebook and are appropriate targets for censorship.103  In public remarks, 
both of Facebook’s top executives, Zuckerberg and Sandberg, have referred 
to “bad actors” as Facebook’s “adversaries.”104   
 
addition, the Report made clear that it did not include “blocked attempts” to create fake accounts 
in its reported figures.  Id. 
 101 The New York Times has recounted how Facebook’s security head, Alex Stamos, informed the 
company’s Audit Committee in September 2017 about internal findings on the role of Russian-
linked groups on the company’s network.  See Sheera Frenkel et al., Delay, Deny and Deflect: How 
Facebook’s Leaders Leaned Out in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
11/14/technology/facebook-data-russia-election-racism.html (recounting the fallout from Alex 
Stamos’ discoveries within Facebook). 
 102 The earliest use of “bad actor” by a Facebook executive appears to be from October 2014, when 
Chris Cox apologized to the LGBTQ community in a blog post for the company’s real-name policy.  
Cox wrote that “99 percent” of the “several hundred thousand fake name reports” that Facebook 
processed “every single week” “are bad actors doing bad things: impersonation, bullying, trolling, 
domestic violence, scams, hate speech, and more.”  Chris Cox, FACEBOOK (Oct. 1, 2014, 2:22 
PM), https://www.facebook.com/chris.cox/posts/10101301777354543.  The use of the term by 
Facebook and its executives became much more common starting in June of 2017.  See, e.g., 
Conference Call of Facebook Executives on Second Quarter 2017 Earnings 2 (July 26, 2017), 
available at https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2017/Q2/Q2-'17-Earnings-
call-transcript.pdf (documenting the comments of Mark Zuckerberg); Conference Call of Facebook 
Executives on Third Quarter 2017 Earnings 2–3 (Nov. 1, 2017), available at 
https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2017/Q3/Q3-'17-Earnings-call-transcr
ipt.pdf  (noting Zuckerberg’s use of “bad actors” three times); Exclusive Interview with Facebook’s Sheryl 
Sandberg, AXIOS (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.axios.com/exclusive-interview-with-facebooks-
sheryl-sandberg-1513306121-64e900b7-55da-4087-afee-92713cbbfa81.html (recording a 
statement by Sheryl Sandberg in which she used the term). 
 103 See, e.g., Alex Stamos, Authenticity Matters: The IRA Has No Place on Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM 
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/authenticity-matters/ (describing the 
Russia-based Internet Research Agency as a “bad actor”). 
 104 Testimony of Sheryl Sandberg, supra note 48, at 1–2; Alex Stamos, How Much Can Companies Know 
About Who’s Behind Cyber Threats?, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (July 31, 2018), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/07/removing-bad-actors-on-facebook/#whos-behind-
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Executives at other social media companies quickly adopted the use of 
“bad actors,”105 or sometimes “bad-faith actors.”106  The term moved to the 
news media,107 and the presidential administration,108 and is now commonly 
used by speakers outside of the industry.   
 
cyber-threats (“[Facebook] face[s] determined, well-funded adversaries who will never give up and 
are constantly changing tactics.  It’s an arms race and we need to constantly improve too.  It’s why 
we’re investing heavily in more people and better technology to prevent bad actors misusing 
Facebook—as well as working much more closely with law enforcement and other tech companies 
to better understand the threats we face.”); Nathaniel Gleicher, Removing Bad Actors on Facebook, 
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (July 31, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/07/removing-
bad-actors-on-facebook/. 
 105 See, e.g., Ronan Costello, Working Together for a Safer Internet, TWITTER BLOG (Feb. 5, 2019),  
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/SaferInternetDay2019.html (“[Twitter 
will] continue to make it more difficult for bad actors to create spammy or fake accounts that 
manipulate our platform”); Donie O’Sullivan, Drew Griffin & Curt Devine, In Attempt to Sow Fear, 
Russian Trolls Paid for Self-Defense Classes for African Americans, CNN BUSINESS (Oct. 18, 2017, 9:30 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/18/media/black-fist-russia-self-defense-classes/index.html 
(demonstrating an instance of the technology company Eventbrite using “bad actor”); Expanding Our 
Work Against Abuse of Our Platform, YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://youtube.googleblog.com/2017/12/expanding-our-work-against-abuse-of-our.html (using 
the term “bad actor” three times); see also Faster Removals and Tackling Comments—An Update on What 
We’re Doing to Enforce YouTube’s Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG (Dec. 13, 2018), 
https://youtube.googleblog.com/2018/12/faster-removals-and-tackling-comments.html (“The 
vast majority of attempted abuse [on YouTube] comes from bad actors . . . .”).  
 106 See, e.g., Vinja Gadde & Kayvon Beykpour, Setting the Record Straight on Shadow Banning, TWITTER 
BLOG (July 26, 2018), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/Setting-
the-record-straight-on-shadow-banning.html (noting that Twitter must “address bad-faith actors 
who intend to manipulate or detract from healthy conversation”). 
 107 Major media outlets that have integrated the term “bad actors” into their news reporting include 
the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post.  See, e.g., Brian X. Chen, Unknown 
Tech Brands Aren’t Like Groceries. Don’t Just Grab Them., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/personaltech/beware-unknown-tech-brand
s.html (“Smartphones . . . are embedded with microphones, motion sensors and cameras that can 
spy on your every move if corrupted by a bad actor”); Dustin Volz, U.S. Girds for Possible Russian 
Meddling on Election Day, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 5, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/u-s-girds-for-possible-russian-meddling-on-election-day-1541421000 (describing how one 
model of ballot-counting machine “has a flaw detected over a decade ago that could give a bad 
actor with physical access the ability to change a vote tally”); Lori Aratani, U.S. Customs Officials 
Thwart Egyptian Locust Invasion, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018, 4:55 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2018/12/04/us-customs-officials-thwart-egyp
tian-locust-invasion/ (“Like many other types of locusts, the Egyptian tree locust is a bad actor, a 
very bad actor.”). 
 108 Sarah Huckabee Sanders, then the White House Press Secretary, attached the “bad actor” label to 
a former FBI official, Andrew McCabe.  See Ben Yagoda, ‘Bad Actor’ Is Everywhere. When Did It Start?, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/linguafranca/2018
/03/26/bad-actor-is-everywhere-when-did-it-start/; see also Excerpts from Trump’s Interview with the 
Times, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/us/politics/trump-
interview-transcripts.html (quoting President Trump as stating that “Iran is a bad actor”); Donald 
J. Trump, Pres. of the United States, Remarks on Combatting Drug Demand and the Opioid Crisis 
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4.  Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior 
Over time, social media companies have made a shift from characterizing 
inauthentic identity as a status to characterizing it as a behavior.  For 
example, after the 2016 election, Facebook began prohibiting “coordinated 
inauthentic behavior,” which, according to Sheryl Sandberg, is “when 
multiple accounts—including both fake and authentic accounts—work 
together to mislead people.”109  Facebook’s current Community Standards 
tell users to not:   
• Engage in or claim to engage in Inauthentic Behavior, which is defined 
as the use of Facebook or Instagram assets (accounts, pages, groups, or 
events), to mislead people or Facebook: 
▪ about the identity, purpose, or origin of the entity that they 
represent 
▪ about the popularity of Facebook or Instagram content or assets 
▪ about the purpose of an audience or community 
▪ about the source or origin of content 
▪ to evade enforcement under our Community Standards 
• Engage in, or claim to engage in Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior, 
defined as the use of multiple Facebook or Instagram assets, working in 
concert to engage in Inauthentic Behavior (as defined above), where the 
use of fake accounts is central to the operation 
• Engage in or claim to engage in Foreign or Government Interference, 
which is Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior conducted on behalf of a 
foreign or government actor110 
Thus, under Facebook’s evolving rules, it is now possible to have an 
authentic identity on Facebook but to nonetheless violate the company’s 
rules against inauthentic behavior.  Individuals who engage in coordinated 
 
(Oct. 26, 2017), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-combatting-drug-demand-opioid-crisis/ (noting that the President was looking at bringing 
“major lawsuits” against “bad actors” involved in the opioid trade). 
 109 Testimony of Sheryl Sandberg, supra note 48, at 3; see also Sacha Pfeiffer, Inside Saudi Arabia’s 
Disinformation Campaign, NPR (Aug. 10, 2019, 8:34 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/
10/750086287/inside-saudi-arabias-disinformation-campaign (explaining that coordinated 
inauthentic behavior is “Facebook’s catch-all term for groups of accounts that work together to 
mislead about either who they are or what they’re doing”).  Sandberg stated that coordinated 
inauthentic behavior “is not allowed because we don’t want organizations or individuals creating 
networks of accounts that misinform people about who they are or what they’re doing.”  Testimony 
of Sheryl Sandberg, supra note 48, at 3.  
 110 Facebook Community Standards: Inauthentic Behavior, FACEBOOK https://www.facebook.com/comm
unitystandards/inauthentic_behavior/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2020).  These standards were updated to 
“explicitly ban coordinated inauthentic behavior” in late 2018.  See Telephone Interview of 
Facebook Officials (Nov. 15, 2018), available at  https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2018/
11/call-transcript-11_15_2018.pdf. 
 
May 2020] BAD ACTORS 647 
inauthentic behavior are “bad actors” and are subject to censorship on that 
basis.111   
Twitter also picked up the use of the term “coordinated inauthentic 
behavior”112 and has said that it considers behavior a “signal” for “serving 
healthy public conversation.”113  The company has explained that it uses the 
following signals to identify “bad-faith actors”: 
• Specific account properties that indicate authenticity (e.g. whether you 
have a confirmed email address, how recently your account was created, 
whether you uploaded a profile image, etc) 
• What actions you take on Twitter (e.g. who you follow, who you 
retweet, etc) 
• How other accounts interact with you (e.g. who mutes you, who follows 
you, who retweets you, who blocks you, etc)114   
The second and third signals are based on expressive behavior, although the 
third signal focuses not on a speaker’s own expressive behavior, but the 
expressive behavior of others.115 
In 2019, Twitter publicly apologized for purging accounts belonging to 
pro-democracy activists tweeting about China in advance of the thirtieth 
anniversary of the Tiananmen Square uprising.116  The purge, which Twitter 
characterized as a “routine” action against accounts “engaging in a mix of 
spamming, inauthentic behavior, and ban evasion,” removed accounts 
 
 111 See, e.g., Annual Reports, FACEBOOK INVESTOR RELATIONS, https://investor.fb.com/financials/
default.aspx (follow hyperlinks to corresponding Form 10-K for each fiscal year) (last visited Mar. 
26, 2020).  
 112 See, e.g., TWITTER, RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW: TWITTER, INC. AND THE 2018 MIDTERM 
ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (Feb. 4, 2019), available at https://blog.twitter.com/content
/dam/blog-twitter/official/en_us/company/2019/2018-retrospective-review.pdf (using the term 
“coordinated inauthentic behavior”). 
 113 Vijaya Gadde & Kayvon Beykpour, Setting the Record Straight on Shadow Banning, TWITTER BLOG (July 
26, 2018), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/Setting-the-record-stra
ight-on-shadow-banning.html.  
 114 Id. 
 115 See also Vijaya Gadde, Confidence in Follower Counts, TWITTER BLOG (July 11, 2018), https://blog.
twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/Confidence-in-Follower-Counts.html (“If we 
detect sudden changes in account behavior, we may lock the account and contact the owner to 
confirm they still have control of it.  These sudden changes in behavior could include Tweeting a 
large volume of unsolicited replies or mentions, Tweeting misleading links, or if a large number of 
accounts block the account after mentioning them . . . .”). 
 116 See Anthony Ha, Twitter Takes Down a Large Number of Chinese-Language Accounts Ahead of the Tiananmen 
Square Anniversary, TECHCRUNCH (June 1, 2019, 3:24 PM),  https://techcrunch.com/
2019/06/01/twitter-china-takedown/ (describing Twitter’s efforts to suspend accounts before the 
thirtieth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre). 
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belonging to prominent anti-Communist activists in the United States.117  
“Sometimes our routine actions catch false positives or we make errors,” the 
company tweeted.118   
Facebook has emphasized that its focus on behavior allows it to avoid 
regulating on the basis of content.  For example, in October 2018, Facebook 
removed 559 Pages and 251 accounts for violating its rules against 
coordinated inauthentic behavior.119  In a blog post disclosing the take-down, 
Facebook’s head of cybersecurity policy said that:   
the ‘news’ stories or opinions these accounts and Pages share are often 
indistinguishable from legitimate political debate.  That is why it’s so 
important we look at these actors’ behavior—such as whether they’re using 
fake accounts or repeatedly posting spam—rather than their content when 
deciding which of these accounts, Pages or Groups to remove.120   
 
 117 Id.  The episode prompted U.S. Senator Marco Rubio to accuse Twitter of acting as a Chinese 
government censor.  Marco Rubio (@marcorubio), TWITTER (June 1, 2019, 5:58 AM), 
https://twitter.com/marcorubio/status/1134806381775806464.  
 118 Twitter Public Policy (@policy), TWITTER (June 1, 2019, 7:16 AM), 
https://twitter.com/Policy/status/1134825963089465.  In October 2018, Twitter pulled down “a 
network of suspected Twitter bots” for authenticity violations, after an NBC News journalist showed 
Twitter that the accounts, from Saudi Arabia, were tweeting and retweeting a set of pro-
government talking points.  Ben Collins & Shoshana Wodinsky, Twitter Pulls Down Bot Network that 
Pushed Pro-Saudi Talking Points about Disappeared Journalist, NBC NEWS (Oct. 18, 2018, 6:39 PM),  
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/exclusive-twitter-pulls-down-bot-network-pushing-p
ro-saudi-talking-n921871.  The reporter discovered the bot network “by analyzing a trove of 
Twitter data and finding accounts that were created on the same date and had similar numbers of 
followers, tweets and likes.  From there, he compiled a list of hundreds of accounts that tweeted 
identical tweets at the same time.”  Id.  There was good evidence that this was a bot network: many 
accounts had been created on the same day, had similar numbers of followers, and tweeted at the 
same time.  Notably, though, the content of the tweets was treated as evidence of inauthenticity.  
Months later, when “about 200,000” Saudi Arabian Twitter users defected to a new social media 
network, Parler, to protest the takedowns, a Reuters analysis presented the defectors as real 
people—political nationalists and supporters of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—who 
objected to unexplained takedowns by the company.  Elizabeth Culliford & Katie Paul, Unhappy 
with Twitter, Thousands of Saudis Crash Pro-Trump Social Network Parler, REUTERS (June 13, 2019, 4:37 
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-twitter-saudi-politics/unhappy-at-twitter-thousands-of-
saudis-crash-pro-trump-social-network-idUSKCN1TE32S.  The Reuters journalists interviewed a 
defector, who objected to Twitter banning accounts of nationalists “without explanation.”  Id.  The 
story suggests that some accounts shut down for authenticity violations were fake accounts, but that 
others might not have been.  If some real speakers were shut down as part of an authenticity 
enforcement exercise, it’s likely because they tweeted or retweeted similar content as the “bad 
actors” the company sought to silence. 
 119 Nathaniel Gleicher & Oscar Rodriguez, Removing Additional Inauthentic Activity from Facebook, 
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Oct. 11, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/10/removing-
inauthentic-activity/. 
 120 Id. (emphasis in the original).  Just a few days before the November 2018 midterm elections, 
Facebook pulled more fake accounts, claiming to have received a tip from U.S. law enforcement.  
Nathaniel Gleicher, Election Update, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Nov. 5, 2018),  
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In December 2018, Facebook published a video in which its head of 
cybersecurity policy explained more about “coordinated inauthentic 
behavior.”121  The official stated: “[w]hen we take down one of these 
[coordinated inauthentic] networks, it’s because of their deceptive behavior.  
It’s not because of the content they’re sharing.  The posts themselves may 
not be false, and may not go against our community standards.”122   
That month, Facebook pulled down the accounts of five American 
technology experts for “coordinated inauthentic behavior” in connection 
with their activities around the Alabama Senate election in 2017.123  The 
technology experts had not employed false identities; rather, they had 
created a Facebook Page, titled “Alabama Conservative Politics,” when they 
really “leaned Democratic.”124  The Page transmitted links to news articles 
published by major news outlets, such as the Washington Post and Fox News, 
and encouraged conservative voters to cast their ballots for a write-in 
candidate rather than the Republican nominee.125  Facebook apparently 
 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/11/election-update/ (“On Sunday evening, US law 
enforcement contacted us about online activity that they recently discovered and which they believe 
may be linked to foreign entities.”). 
 121 Nathaniel Gleicher, Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Explained, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Dec. 6, 
2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/12/inside-feed-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior/. 
 122 Id. (video remarks of Nathaniel Gleicher). 
 123 See, e.g., Scott Shane, Facebook Closes 5 Accounts That Adopted Russian Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 
2018, at A27 (describing Facebook’s actions of removing accounts associated with election 
deception in Alabama’s U.S. Senate election).  Only one of the five individuals has been identified: 
Jonathon Morgan, the Chief Executive Officer of an Austin-based cybersecurity firm, New 
Knowledge.  According to the New York Times, Morgan has acknowledged participating in a “secret 
Alabama operation on Facebook and Twitter” but described it as “a small experiment designed to 
understand such techniques.”  Id.  Democrat Doug Jones won the election. 
 124 Id. (explaining that the five “created a Facebook page on which they posed as conservative 
Alabamians”).  In a twist, the deceptive campaign was reportedly funded by Reid Hoffman, the co-
founder of another social media company, LinkedIn.  Id. 
 125 Id. (describing the acts of the five technology experts as “deceptive tactics”); see also Craig Timberg, 
Tony Romm & Aaron C. Davis, Researcher Whose Firm Wrote Report on Russian Interference Used 
Questionable Online Tactics During Alabama Senate Race, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2018, 10:21 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/19/researcher-affiliated-with-russian-
interference-senate-report-used-questionable-online-tactics-during-alabama-senate-race/ (explain-
ing how a leading social media researcher, Jonathon Morgan, engaged in misleading online tactics 
during the Alabama election); Scott Shane & Alan Blinder, Secret Experiment in Alabama Senate Race 
Imitated Russian Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
12/19/us/alabama-senate-roy-jones-russia.html (mentioning Morgan’s involvement in the 
Alabama election).  The deceptive tactics involved “creating a misleading Facebook page to appeal 
to conservatives” and “purchasing retweets on Twitter to measure the potential ‘lift’ of political 
messages.”  Tony Romm & Craig Timberg, Facebook Suspends Five Accounts, Including That of a Social 
Media Researcher, For Misleading Tactics in Alabama Election, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2018, 9:22 AM), 
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treated this as a violation of its rules against coordinated inauthentic behavior 
on the ground that it involved deception—a sort of political valence 
deception.126   
Before the 2018 midterm elections, Twitter put together a “cross-
functional team” devoted to “site and service integrity.”127  The team created 
a “political conversations dashboard” whose purpose was to “surface 
information about sudden shifts in sentiment around a specific conversation, 
suggesting a potential coordinated campaign of activity.”128  Twitter was 
studying political content on its network to uncover evidence of 
inauthenticity.  It had put speakers’ associations and political expression 
under the microscope in order to ferret out “bad faith” discourse.  One can 
imagine how this approach might be useful for flagging a false news story or 
identifying the originator of a false news story—except that Twitter does not 
remove content for being false.129  Rather, it looks for patterns in associations 
(and possibly changes in political valence) to establish inauthenticity, which 
is a basis for removing content.  
C.  Identity Verification 
Facebook had a small program of identity verification dating back years 
before the 2016 election; the company originally began verifying identities 
when user reports challenged an account’s authenticity.  Starting in 2012, 
Facebook began offering identity verification more broadly, to certain public 
figures and celebrities, on a voluntary basis.130  The company selected which 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/22/facebook-suspends-five-accounts-
including-social-media-researcher-misleading-tactics-alabama-election/. 
 126 Social media companies have long claimed the ability to infer users’ political affiliations from their 
online behavior.  See, e.g., Jeremy B. Merrill, Liberal, Moderate or Conservative? See How Facebook Labels 
You, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/us/politics/facebook-
ads-politics.html (noting how Facebook categorizes users into political affiliations based on liked 
pages).  The use of such predictions to establish “inauthentic behavior” could result in a company 
flagging speech that falls outside the company’s assessment of a speaker’s political valence. 
 127 TWITTER, RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW: TWITTER, INC. AND THE 2018 MIDTERM ELECTIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 8 (Feb. 4, 2019), available at https://blog.twitter.com/content/dam/blog-
twitter/official/en_us/company/2019/2018-retrospective-review.pdf 
 128 Id. 
 129 On March 27, 2020, Twitter published some new guidelines that suggest it is removing false content 
related to COVID-19.  See An Update on Our Content Moderation Work, TWITTER BLOG (Mar. 27, 
2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-19.html#moderation (re-
quiring people to remove tweets that include “[d]enial of established scientific facts about 
transmission” of COVID-19). 
 130 See Josh Constine, Facebook Launches Verified Accounts and Pseudonyms, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 15, 2012, 
10:07 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2012/02/15/facebook-verified-accounts-alternate-names/ 
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celebrities and public figures were eligible for verification and, as an 
inducement, promised to promote verified users more frequently in the 
“subscribe suggestions” of the general public, which would likely increase 
their subscriptions.131  Thus, in an early incarnation, identity verification 
involved a value-based exchange: the user turned over his or her data for 
verification in return for Facebook’s promotion of the user to others.  Today, 
verification still “comes with perks.”132   
Facebook did not introduce the blue checkmark as a visual confirmation 
of verification until 2013.133  After the 2016 election, some critics argued that 
Facebook had contributed to toxic political discourse by giving “coveted blue 
check marks” “to partisan accounts on the right and left,” thereby “lending 
them an air of credibility.”134   
 
(“[Verified accounts are] a way to ensure people don’t subscribe to the public updates of 
imposters.”).  Facebook had experienced some high-profile instances of stolen identity in the years 
preceding this move.  In 2010, for example, the Facebook identity of the secretary general of 
Interpol, Ronald K. Noble, was impersonated by two different profiles, at least one of which was 
seeking to obtain information on targets of an Interpol operation.  Josh Halliday, Facebook Brings in 
Extra Safeguards to Block Scams, GUARDIAN, Sept. 21, 2010, at 7.  Writing in 2014, Chris Cox, a 
Facebook executive, explained that when a user account was reported as potentially fake, the 
company would “ask the flagged accounts to verify they are using real names by submitting some 
form of ID—gym membership, library card, or piece of mail.”  Chris Cox, FACEBOOK (Oct. 1, 
2014, 2:22 PM), https://www.facebook.com/chris.cox/posts/10101301777354543.  Twitter, a 
Facebook competitor, offered identity verification as early as 2009, but endured a scandal in 2012 
when it erroneously verified a fake account as belonging to Wendi Deng, wife of News Corp.’s 
chairman Rupert Murdoch.  See Adam Clark Estes, How Twitter Accidentally Verified the Wrong Wendi 
Deng, ATLANTIC (Jan. 4, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/01/how-
twitter-accidentally-verified-wrong-wendi-deng/333529/ (noting that the error was due to 
misplaced punctuation).   
 131 Josh Constine, Facebook Launches Verified Accounts and Pseudonyms, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 15, 2012, 
10:07 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2012/02/15/facebook-verified-accounts-alternate-names/ 
(“Stefani Germanotta, aka Lady Gaga, could use Verified Accounts to verify that she is the famous 
Stefani Germanotta, to display her name as ‘Stefani Germanotta (Lady Gaga)’, or display it as 
simply ‘Lady Gaga’ with Stefani Germanotta appearing in the About page of her profile. Lady 
Gaga would then appear more frequently in Facebook’s Subscribe suggestions.”). 
 132 Taylor Lorenz, The Problem With Verification, ATLANTIC (June 25, 2019), https://www.theatlan
tic.com/technology/archive/2019/06/instagram-and-twitter-should-eliminate-verification/5923
51/ (“[When verified,] your comments are sometimes featured higher, it’s harder to impersonate 
you, and you get more robust insights on your personal account.”). 
 133 Brittany Darwell, Facebook Launches Verified Pages and Profiles to Help Users Identify Authentic Accounts, 
ADWEEK (May 29, 2013), https://www.adweek.com/digital/facebook-launches-verified-pages-
and-profiles-to-help-users-identify-authentic-accounts/. 
 134 Emma Roller, Your Facts or Mine?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/10/25/opinion/campaign-stops/your-facts-or-mine.html; see also Ariana Tobin, Madeleine 
Varner & Julia Angwin, Facebook’s Uneven Enforcement of Hate Speech Rules Allows Vile Posts to Stay Up, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 28, 2017, 5:53 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-
enforcement-hate-speech-rules-mistakes (noting that Facebook pages run by organizations 
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In April 2018, Facebook introduced new, mandatory identity verification 
for political advertisements.135  It presented the program as a solution to 
problems of political advertisement transparency, which had become a focal 
point for social media critics after the 2016 election.  Facebook’s roll out 
emphasized the company’s good-faith corporate citizenship in adopting the 
new measures, which, it noted, went beyond the requirements of campaign-
finance law.136   
The new rules applied to “U.S. advertisers and advertisers targeting the 
U.S.” who sought to use Facebook’s paid tools to enhance the distribution of 
their speech relating “to any national legislative issue of public importance 
in any place where the ad is being run.”137  Facebook provided a lengthy list 
of topics it considered de facto “national issues of public importance” in the 
United States, which included abortion, crime, health, and “values.”138  
Facebook has used the term “issue ad” to describe communications covered 
by the rules, picking up on a term commonly used by election lawyers.139  
The topics requiring Facebook’s authenticity pre-clearance reflect value 
judgments by the company; for example, “poverty” was a “political” topic 
under Facebook’s rules but “wealth” was not.140   
 
identified by the Southern Poverty Law Center as hate groups “are decked out with verification 
checkmarks”). 
 135 See Rob Goldman & Alex Himel, Making Ads and Pages More Transparent, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM 
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/transparent-ads-and-pages/ (preventing 
advertisers from running political advertisements until they are authorized).   
 136 See, e.g., Mark Zuckerberg, Preparing for Elections, FACEBOOK NOTES (September 12, 2018),  
https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/preparing-for-elections/101563000476066
34/ (“Facebook now has a higher standard of ads transparency than has ever existed with TV or 
newspaper ads.”).   
 137 Ads About Social Issues, Elections or Politics, FACEBOOK BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/
business/help/1838453822893854 (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).  The full list was: abortion, budget, 
civil rights, crime, economy, education, energy, environment, foreign policy, government reform, 
guns, health, immigration, infrastructure, military, poverty, social security, taxes, terrorism, and 
values.  The identity verification process was announced on April 23, 2018.  The Authorization Process 
for US Advertisers to Run Political Ads on Facebook is Now Open, FACEBOOK BUSINESS (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.facebook.com/business/news/the-authorization-process-for-us-advertisers-to-run-
political-ads-on-facebook-is-now-open.  
 138 Ads About Social Issues, Elections or Politics, FACEBOOK BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/busi
ness/help/1838453822893854 (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).  
 139 See Rob Goldman & Alex Himel, Making Ads and Pages More Transparent, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM 
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/transparent-ads-and-pages/ (noting 
that authorization will be required of “anyone that wants to show ‘issue ads’—like political topics 
that are being debated across the country”).   
 140 See id. 
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Under the rules, in order to use Facebook’s paid tools to speak on a 
“political” subject, the speaker must “be authorized” by Facebook—a 
process that requires the speaker to “go through the U.S. residency and ID 
verification flow.”141  The speaker must submit to Facebook an image of his 
or her U.S. passport, driver’s license, or state photo identification; at one 
time, a speaker was also required to submit the last four digits of his or her 
Social Security number.  Facebook then mails a code to the speaker’s 
residential address in the United States, which the user must input to confirm 
his or her identity.  In other words, in the verification process, Facebook 
collects at least the following information about a user: a photo of his or her 
face, his or her full legal name, height and weight, date of birth, and home 
address.  For some, the process may reveal a prior home address, information 
about visual and other impairments on a driver’s license, and citizenship 
status, among other things.  Thus, identity verification provides valuable, 
individualized data to Facebook about users.  In essence, identity verification 
functions as a system of prior restraint, requiring users to obtain what 
amounts to a Facebook “license” in order to engage in certain types of 
political expression.142   
Facebook has announced expansions of identity verification at least twice.  
In May 2018, Facebook clarified that it would apply its identity verification 
rules to all publishers of paid content, including news publishers.143  In other 
words, news outlets that use Facebook’s paid tools to boost content must put 
forward a business manager to go through identity verification.  Since this 
announcement, Facebook has silenced paid posts promoting news stories on 
public policy matters by publications like the Wall Street Journal.144   
 
 141 Ads About Social Issues, Elections or Politics, FACEBOOK BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/busi
ness/help/1838453822893854 (last visited May 25, 2020); Confirm Your Identity, FACEBOOK 
BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/business/help/2992964394067299?id=2887621019090
05 (last visited May 25, 2020).  
 142 See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech 
Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1177–78 (2018) (“[N]ew school speech regulation—which 
encourages blocking and filtering—is analogous to prior restraint.”). 
 143 See Josh Constine, Facebook and Instagram Launch US Political Ad Labeling and Archive, TECHCRUNCH 
(May 24, 2018, 2:01 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/24/facebook-political-ad-archive/ 
(requiring “paid for by” labels on political and issue ads). 
 144 See Jeremy B. Merrill & Ariana Tobin, Facebook’s Screening for Political Ads Nabs News Sites Instead of 
Politicians, PROPUBLICA (June 15, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/
facebook-new-screening-system-flags-the-wrong-ads-as-political (noting that “hot-button issues” 
are likely to pop up in posts from news organizations in addition to political ads, which creates 
complications). 
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Separately, Facebook has announced that it plans to expand identity 
verification beyond paid speech on political subjects.  It has said that in the 
future it will require “people who manage Pages with large numbers of 
followers” to have their identities verified.145  The company has made it clear 
that unverified individuals who manage “large Pages” “will no longer be able 
to post.”146  Instagram, which is owned by Facebook, introduced verification 
for a subset of users in 2014 and expanded its reach in 2018.147   
Since their implementation, Facebook’s identity verification rules have 
been repeatedly criticized for censoring legitimate political expression, as 
well as non-political speech.148  An investigation by the Washington Post turned 
up numerous instances in which Facebook had refused to transmit paid 
content that included references to identity groups, such as promotions of 
events related to LGBT issues, without identity verification, because 
Facebook considered such content “political.”149  In particular, the 
Washington Post recounted the experience of Thomas Garguilo, a New Yorker 
who sought unsuccessfully to pay to promote a Facebook post about a panel 
discussion with an LGBT radio station in Washington.  A Facebook 
employee responded to Garguilo’s complaint by explaining that his proposed 
content “mentions LGBT which would fall under the category of civil rights 
 
 145 Rob Goldman & Alex Himel, Making Ads and Pages More Transparent, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM  
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/transparent-ads-and-pages/; see also 
Testimony of Sheryl Sandberg, supra note 48, at 2 (stating that Facebook will require “people that 
run Pages with large audiences in the U.S.” to “go through an authorization process and confirm 
their location”). 
 146 Rob Goldman & Alex Himel, Making Ads and Pages More Transparent, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 
6, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/transparent-ads-and-pages/ (“[T]his will 
make it much harder for people to administer a Page using a fake account, which is strictly against 
our policies.”). 
 147 See Taylor Lorenz, The Problem with Verification, ATLANTIC (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/06/instagram-and-twitter-should-elimin
ate-verification/592351/ (noting expansion through the introduction of a public verification 
request form). 
 148 See, e.g., David Gale, Facebook’s Problems with Veterans, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 7, 2018, 6:55 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooks-problem-with-veterans-1533682511 (quoting founder of 
We Are Mighty, a “media brand” for American military veterans and their families, objecting that 
under Facebook’s new rules, “if anything in our posts uses the word ‘military,’ we are classified as 
a ‘political’ advertiser” and must register). 
 149 See Eli Rosenberg, Facebook Blocked Many Gay-Themed Ads as Part of Its New Advertising Policy, Angering 
LGBT Groups, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2018, 4:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2018/10/03/facebook-blocked-many-gay-themed-ads-part-its-new-advertising-policy
-angering-lgbt-groups/ (noting that Facebook blocked dozens of advertisements mentioning LGBT 
themes and words). 
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which is a political topic.”150  The Washington Post reporters found that, in 
enforcing its identity verification rules, Facebook rejected advertisements 
that included, among other things, “a celebration of Nigerian Independence 
Day in Houston,” “a post with facts about Holocaust diarist Anne Frank,” 
and “a list of senior-friendly housing options distributed by a nonprofit group 
in Texas.”151   
Since 2009, Twitter has also employed verification; like Facebook, it 
originally offered a “blue badge” only to celebrities and public figures.152  In 
2017, Twitter temporarily suspended verification in response to public 
 
 150 See id. (“Garguilo said that so many of his ads have gotten blocked by Facebook that he has stopped 
using the words “LGBT” or “gay” in his language on the service.”).   
 151 Id.  Numerous other critics and investigators found that Facebook’s identity verification rules were 
shutting down speech.  ProPublica found that Facebook had refused, without identity verification, 
to promote many news articles published by independent news outlets, such as The Hechinger 
Report, Voice of Monterey Bay, and BirminghamWatch.  Jeremy B. Merrill & Ariana Tobin, 
Facebook’s Screening for Political Ads Nabs News Sites Instead of Politicians, PROPUBLICA (June 15, 2018, 
12:39 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-new-screening-system-flags-the-wrong-
ads-as-political.  The Nuyorican Poets Café, a New York cultural nonprofit, was prevented from 
paying to promote a post encouraging people to vote in the midterm elections.  Daniel Gallant, 
Facebook Censors at Random, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 9, 2018, 5:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/facebook-censors-at-random-1544395970.  Facebook stopped the Boston Museum of Fine 
Arts from paying to promote a lecture about sculpture.  Id.  Facebook prevented Arts Japan 2020, 
a cultural organization, from paying to promote a post “celebrating an award given by the emperor 
of Japan to an American arts curator.”  Id.  The company stopped a nonprofit from advertising a 
fundraiser for disabled veterans.  See J. Nathan Matias, Austin Hounsel & Melissa Hopkins, We 
Tested Facebook’s Ad Screeners and Some Were Too Strict, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/11/do-big-social-media-platforms-have-
effective-ad-policies/574609/ (“Facebook ruled that the fundraiser was ‘related to politics or issues 
of national importance’ and needed special authorization.”).  And it prevented a Long Island 
nonprofit, the LGBT Network, from paying to promote the Long Island Pride Parade, a beach 
concert, a pride-themed night at a New York Mets baseball game, and an LGBT-youth prom.  See 
Eli Rosenberg, Facebook Blocked Many Gay-Themed Ads as Part of Its New Advertising Policy, Angering LGBT 
Groups, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2018, 4:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/tech
nology/2018/10/03/facebook-blocked-many-gay-themed-ads-part-its-new-advertising-policy-an
gering-lgbt-groups/ (reporting that “The Washington Post found dozens of advertisements 
mentioning LGBT themes and words that [Facebook] blocked for supposedly being political,” and 
that Facebook told the Post that “the majority” of these were “in error”).  Facebook prevented 
Marsha Bonner, a motivational LGBT speaker, from paying to promote an NAACP-sponsored 
conference about LGBTQ people of color.  Id.   
 152 Laignee Baron, Twitter Wants to Verify All Users as a Way to Prove Identity, FORTUNE (Mar. 9, 2018), 
https://fortune.com/2018/03/09/twitter-verification-all-users/; see Kurt Wagner, This is Why 
Everyone is Upset About Twitter’s Blue Check Mark Verification Policy, VOX (Nov. 9, 2017, 2:58 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2017/11/9/16629796/twitter-halts-verification-white-supremacist-jason-
kessler-policy-blue-check-mark (noting that, at the time, Twitter verified “all kinds of accounts it 
considers ‘of public interest,’ including celebrities, athletes and journalists”). 
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outcry about its verification of accounts of prominent white supremacists.153  
Twitter resolved the controversy by rescinding the blue badge from the white 
supremacists’ accounts, and ever since has used rescission occasionally to 
punish verified users for content violations.154  In 2018, for example, it 
removed the verified blue check from Louis Farakhan’s account after he 
published an anti-Semitic tweet.155   
D.  Micro-Targeting 
Companies’ back-office customization, described in Part I.A above, must 
be understood as a core part of their speech regulation.  Essentially, many 
social media companies earn profits by charging advertisers to use their 
advertisement customization tools.  The tools use data analytics to help 
advertisers target their speech to certain recipients, on the basis of those 
recipients’ identifying characteristics and behavior.  This practice is known 
as micro-targeting.156   
ProPublica has published several important articles on Facebook’s micro-
targeting tools.157  One of its key observations is that Facebook’s 
 
 153 See id. (discussing criticism of Twitter for verifying the account of Jason Kessler, one of the organizers 
of the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017); Twitter Support 
(@TwitterSupport), TWITTER (Nov. 9, 2017, 8:03 PM), https://twitter.com/twitter
support/status/928654369771356162? (“Verification was meant to authenticate identity & voice 
but it is interpreted as an endorsement or an indicator of importance. We recognize that we have 
created this confusion and need to resolve it.  We have paused all general verifications while we 
work and will report back soon.”). 
 154 Kurt Wagner, This is Why Everyone is Upset About Twitter’s Blue Check Mark Verification Policy, VOX  
(Nov. 9, 2017, 2:58 PM), https://www.vox.com/2017/11/9/16629796/twitter-halts-verification-
white-supremacist-jason-kessler-policy-blue-check-mark (noting that Twitter rescinded blue check 
marks from Jason Kessler and Richard Spencer). 
 155 Megan Keller, Twitter Says It Won’t Suspend Louis Farrakhan Over Tweet Comparing Jews to Termites, HILL 
(Oct. 17, 2018, 6:24 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/411950-twitter-says-it-wont-
suspend-louis-farrakhan-over-tweet-comparing-jews-to (reporting that Twitter declined to shut 
down Farrakhan’s account for anti-Semitic content, but had previously removed his verified status 
for a similar offense). 
 156 See Sonia Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of AI, 66 UCLA. L. REV. 54, 91 (2019) (“Since 
websites often rely on predictive algorithms to analyze people's online activities . . . they can create 
profiles based on user behavior, and predict a host of identity characteristics that marketers can 
then use to decide the listings that a user sees online.”). 
 157 See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Madeleine Varner & Ariana Tobin, Facebook Enabled Advertisers to Reach ‘Jew 
Haters, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 14, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-
enabled-advertisers-to-reach-jew-haters (noting how Facebook’s algorithm allowed anti-Semitic 
advertisement categories); Julia Angwin & Terry Parris Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by 
Race, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 28, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-
advertisers-exclude-users-by-race (noting that Facebook allows advertisements that exclude “groups 
it calls Ethnic Affinities.”). 
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advertisement-targeting relies partly on identifying information that users 
voluntarily give Facebook, such as their age, gender, and location, and partly 
on other information, which is gleaned in ways that are likely not well-
understood by users.  These include the user’s online behavior, such as his or 
her actions to associate (or disassociate) with other users, and the content of 
the user’s expression on Facebook.  So, for example, when a user “likes” 
something or posts content on Facebook, those acts are mined by Facebook 
to produce data that can be used as the basis for micro-targeting.  A 
ProPublica study revealed that Facebook allowed “detailed targeting” of an 
advertisement audience based on categories such as “Demographics > 
Education > Field of study,” which, until ProPublica published its findings, 
included subfields like “Jew hater.”158  The detail and granularity of 
Facebook’s advertisement-targeting helps set it apart from competitors.  Not 
only is Facebook’s user base huge—in June 2019, the company had 244 
million monthly active users in the United States and Canada alone159—but 
its micro-targeting tools are finely-tailored to individuals’ identities and 
interests.   
Following ProPublica’s initial reporting, which raised concerns about 
racism and discrimination in advertisement-targeting, Facebook announced 
that it would disable “exclusion options” based on “ethnic affinities” in its 
advertisement tools for housing, credit, and employment advertisements.160  
In July 2018, Facebook went further in a settlement agreement with 
Washington State, which had begun investigating whether Facebook’s 
advertisement-targeting practices violated state laws prohibiting unfair and 
 
 158 Id.  In 2018, fair-housing groups sued Facebook for violating federal law by allowing housing 
advertisers to engage in microtargeting that purposefully excluded families with children and “users 
with interests based on disability and national origin.”  Complaint at 2, National Fair Housing 
Alliance v. Facebook, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) (No. 18 Civ. 2689). 
 159 FACEBOOK, FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 2019, at 28 (2019), 
available at https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2019/FACEBOOK_INC_
10Q_20190725.pdf. 
 160 See Press Release, Wash. State Office of the Att’y Gen., AG Ferguson Investigation Leads to 
Facebook Making Nationwide Changes to Prohibit Discriminatory Advertisements on Its Platform 
(July 24, 2018), available at https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-investi
gation-leads-facebook-making-nationwide-changes-prohibit (noting how the report led to pressure 
from civil rights advocates); Erin Egan, Improving Enforcement and Promoting Diversity: Updates to Ethnic 
Affinity Marketing, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Nov. 11, 2016), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/
2016/11/updates-to-ethnic-affinity-marketing/ (noting Facebook’s voluntary commitment to 
“[b]uild tools to detect and automatically disable the use of ethnic affinity marketing for certain 
types of ads,” to update its Advertising Policies, and to require advertisers to affirm that they will 
not engage in discriminatory advertising). 
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discriminatory practices.161 In the settlement, Facebook agreed to not 
provide an option for advertisers to limit the audience for certain types of 
advertisements by excluding some protected categories, such as race or 
veteran status.162  Although Facebook agreed to extend this commitment 
across the United States, it remains free to earn fees for ad-targeting on the 
basis of other identifying characteristics, such as age, political affiliation, 
education, income, location, job, and health.  Advertisements for other types 
of products and services can continue to target or exclude based on protected 
characteristics.163   
 
 161 Washington’s investigation, begun in November 2016, focused on: section 19.86.020 of the 
Washington Revised Code, prohibiting “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce”; and section 49.60.030.1 of the Washington 
Revised Code, preserving rights to “be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national 
origin, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or the presence of 
any sensory, mental, or physical disability” in connection with employment, public 
accommodations, real estate transactions, credit transactions, and insurance transactions.  
Assurance of Discontinuance at 1, In re Facebook, Inc., No. 18-2-18287-5 SEA (Wash. King Cty. 
Super. Ct. July 24, 2018), available at https://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com
/uploadedfiles/Another/News/Press_Releases/2018_07_23%20AOD.pdf 
 162 The types of advertisements were: employment advertisements, credit advertisements, insurance 
advertisements, and public accommodations advertisements.  See id. at 4–5 (“[B]y way of example, 
Facebook would not allow the option within the Exclusion Targeting Tool to limit audiences based 
on a targeting category for ‘Chinese people’ or “Wheelchair users’ because these categories, on 
their face, act as direct descriptors of Protected Characteristics.  However, Facebook would not 
remove targeting categories such as ‘Chinese literature’ or ‘Disability rights’ as those categories 
identify interests and do not describe Protected Characteristics.”). 
 163 Political advertisement targeting, in particular, has attracted commentators’ attention.  No public 
laws restrict micro-targeting of political advertisements, and Facebook’s settlement with 
Washington State did not address the subject.  In the lead-up to the 2016 election, the IRA and 
affiliated organizations spent about $100,000 on 3519 advertisements on Facebook and Instagram.  
In sworn testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in September 2018, Sheryl 
Sandberg stated that the IRA “used coordinated networks of fake Pages and accounts to interfere 
in the election.”  Testimony of Sheryl Sandberg, supra note 48, at 2.  As of May 2018, the 
advertisements themselves are available online.  Exposing Russia’s Efforts to Sow Discord Online: The 
Internet Research Agency and Advertisements, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT 
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/defa
ult.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2020); see also Deepa Seetharaman, Georgia Wells & Byron Tau, Release 
of Thousands of Russia-Linked Facebook Ads Shows How Propaganda Sharpened, WALL STREET J. (May 10, 
2018, 12:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/full-stock-of-russia-linked-facebook-ads-shows-
how-propaganda-sharpened-1525960804 (noting that the IRA accounts focused on racial and 
social issues early on, and as the election got closer the pages increasingly took on politics).  Some 
of the IRA’s advertisements targeted users in cities affected by racial unrest, such as Ferguson, 
Missouri; others targeted African-Americans, and some targeted users in swing voting states. Details 
of micro-targeting by the IRA is discussed in a series of Wired Magazine articles.  See Issie Lapowsky, 
House Democrats Release 3,500 Russia-Linked Facebook Ads, WIRED (May 10, 2018, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/house-democrats-release-3500-russia-linked-facebook-ads/ (desc-
ribing an advertisement targeted by the IRA at “users age 18 to 45 who were interested in 
BlackNews.com, the color black, or HuffPost Black Voices but were not Hispanic or Asian 
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E.  Product Features 
Social media companies find creative ways to leverage authenticity, 
verification, and users’ data in new product features that shape political 
discourse.  For example, Twitter announced in 2019 that it would suspend 
content-based restrictions for some public officials and candidates for public 
office, allowing only these individuals to publish tweets that violate content 
rules.164  For a tweet to be eligible for this exemption, it must come from a 
verified official or candidate, and have more than 100,000 followers.165  
In June 2017, Facebook introduced a “constituent badge” feature that 
permitted users to pin to their profiles an icon identifying them as 
constituents of particular elected officials.166  The feature utilized the address 
the user attached to his or her account; Facebook only offered users a 
constituent badge for officials serving the districts in which they lived.167  
Facebook then offered elected officials the opportunity to communicate with 
tailored audiences of only verified constituents—for example, hosting 
“virtual town halls” on Facebook Live, attended only by verified 
constituents.168  Journalists immediately pointed out that this system 
 
American”); Issie Lapowsky, How Russian Facebook Ads Divided and Targeted U.S. Voters Before the 2016 
Election, WIRED (April 16, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/russian-facebook-ads-
targeted-us-voters-before-2016-election/ (explaining that dark money advertisements and Russian-
linked advertisements targeted voters in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin, and users in 
Wisconsin were “targeted with gun ads about 72 percent more often than the national average”).  
Trump campaign officials have claimed that the campaign used Facebook’s paid micro-targeting 
tools to direct posts to “idealistic white liberals, young women, and African Americans,” to 
discourage them from voting.  See Joshua Green & Sasha Issenberg, Inside the Trump Bunker, With 
Days to Go, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2016, 6:00 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-10-27/inside-the-trump-bunker-with-12-days-to-go (“We have three major voter 
suppression operations under way.”).  The article described how the Trump campaign used 
Facebook “dark posts” to send to “certain African American voters” an animated message with an 
anti-Clinton theme.  Id. 
 164 See Defining Public Interest on Twitter, TWITTER BLOG (June 27, 2019), https://blog.twitter.com/
en_us/topics/company/2019/publicinterest.html (explaining that it is in the public’s interest to 
have access to certain tweets). 
 165 Id.  Twitter must also determine that the tweet is of public interest.  See id.  (“That said, there are 
cases, such as direct threats of violence or calls to commit violence against an individual, that are 
unlikely to be considered in the public interest.”).  
 166 Griffin Connolly, Facebook Features Connect Lawmakers With Constituents, ROLL CALL (June 8, 2017, 
5:01 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/politics/facebook-features-connect-lawmakers-constituents; 
see also Tools for Government, FACEBOOK FOR GOVERNMENT, POLITICS & ADVOCACY, 
https://politics.fb.com/tools-for-government/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) (“A constituent badge . . . 
appears next to [a person’s] name when they comment on their elected official’s Facebook post.”).  
 167 Connolly, supra note 166.  
 168 Id.  
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significantly shaped news coverage of such events by, for example, 
preventing reporters from attending virtual town halls outside the districts in 
which they lived.169  In its quest to “add value” to politicians’ use of its 
network, Facebook had leveraged an aspect of its users’ identities—the 
location of their homes—to govern the reach of their political speech.170 
* * * 
As outlined above, authenticity rules provide significant business value to 
social media companies.  But social media companies do not typically justify 
authenticity regulation by pointing out its benefits to their business model.  
Instead, companies assert that authenticity is an important value that makes 
online discourse better, and that users should be authentic to further the 
important goal of improving free expression.  The next Part turns to these 
claims and explores whether, in fact, authenticity is an important value that 
justifies companies’ demands for accurate details about users’ “true” selves 
as part of a broad, prosocial speech project.  
II.  THE VALUE OF AUTHENTICITY 
Is authenticity an important expressive value?  Or, does authenticity 
operate as a value that limits free speech, akin to the right of privacy?  Or is 
authenticity, as the term is used by social media companies, something else 
altogether?   
Recall that in Facebook’s early days, Mark Zuckerberg justified the 
company’s real-name policy by arguing that authenticity is a moral virtue.171  
Today, Facebook pairs “authenticity” with “integrity” in its Community 
Standards, reinforcing this moral ideal.  In 2014, a Facebook executive 
offered two more justifications for Facebook’s authenticity rules:   
First, it’s part of what made Facebook special in the first place, by 
differentiating the service from the rest of the internet where pseudonymity, 
anonymity, or often random names were the social norm.  Second, it’s the 
 
 169 Id.  
 170 As part of its Town Hall project, Facebook also introduced “district targeting,” which allows elected 
officials to create posts and polls that were visible only to confirmed constituents, and “constituent 
insights,” which provided elected officials with tools to view and comment on news stories that were 
popular among their constituents.  Faine Greenwood, A Civics Lesson for Facebook, SLATE (Aug. 8, 
2017, 7:15 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2017/08/facebook-now-offers-constituent-
services-what-could-go-wrong.html.  All of these product features were designed to employ network 
technology and data analytics to create value for speakers or listeners by curating speech according 
to the identifying characteristics and behaviors of users. 
 171 See DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT 199–200 (2010) (“Having two identities for 
yourself is an example of a lack of integrity.”).   
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primary mechanism we have to protect millions of people every day, all 
around the world, from real harm.  The stories of mass impersonation, 
trolling, domestic abuse, and higher rates of bullying and intolerance are 
oftentimes the result of people hiding behind fake names, and it’s both 
terrifying and sad.172  
Four years later, a different Facebook executive explained that: 
Facebook was built for conversation and human connection.  It’s why we ask 
that people using our service be themselves—whether it’s an individual, a 
business or a nonprofit.  [W]e’ve worked hard to establish authenticity as a 
social norm because it’s at the heart of most meaningful connections on 
Facebook.173 
In 2019, Facebook amended its Community Standards to include an 
entry for “Authenticity”: “We want to make sure the content people are 
seeing on Facebook is authentic.  We believe that authenticity creates a better 
environment for sharing, and that’s why we don’t want people using 
Facebook to misrepresent who they are or what they’re doing.”174   
 Obviously, these justifications are all different.  However, they advance 
a few key ideas:  First, it is bad to present yourself as anything other than 
what you are.  Second, when people have to reveal their “true selves,” they 
are less likely to produce abusive or hateful speech.  Third, authenticity is an 
essential component of “meaningful” expression, especially because it 
encourages users to express themselves (it “creates a better environment for 
sharing”), but also because authenticity produces “authentic content.”  A 
common theme in these ideas is that a speaker’s authenticity is important 
mainly because it generates benefits for others—for the communicative 
community.  In this view, speaker authenticity is an important value because 
it enhances discourse, and therefore is worth enforcing not only through 
informal social conventions but also sometimes through (private) regulation.   
Yet this premise conflicts with modern ideas about the meaning of 
“authenticity.”  Disciplines ranging from philosophy175 to social 
 
 172 Chris Cox, FACEBOOK (Oct. 1, 2014, 2:22 PM), https://www.facebook.com/
chris.cox/posts/10101301777354543.  It is not clear what Cox meant when he said that “domestic 
abuse” is caused by “people hiding behind fake names.” 
 173 Alex Stamos, Authenticity Matters: The IRA Has No Place on Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 3, 
2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/authenticity-matters/. 
 174 Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2019); Monika Bickert, Updating the Values That Inform Our Community Standards, FACEBOOK 
NEWSROOM (Sept. 12, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/09/updating-the-values-
that-inform-our-community-standards/.  
 175 The philosophical literature on authenticity reaches back at least as far as Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics.  See generally Somogy Varga & Charles Guignon, Authenticity, in STANFORD ENCYC. OF 
PHILOSOPHY 4 (Edward Zalta, Uri Nodelman & Colin Allen eds., 2017), available at 
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psychology176 to pop psychology177 have produced literatures on authenticity, 
mainly recognizing it as producing benefits for the self.178  These disciplines 
tend to characterize authenticity as one or more of the following: (1) a process 
of introspection and self-definition (as in: “be true to yourself”)179; (2) the act of 
following one’s heart or one’s intuition180; (3) consistency between one’s values and 
 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/authenticity/ (describing how an “older 
concept of sincerity, referring to being truthful in order to be honest in one’s dealings with others,” 
was eventually “replaced by a relatively new concept of authenticity, understood as being true to 
oneself for one’s own benefit”); CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY (1991). 
 176 See, e.g., Susan Harter, Authenticity, in HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (C.R. Snyder & 
Shane J. Lopez eds., 2002) (finding that adolescents’ authenticity is correlated with psychological 
benefits); Alison P. Lenton et al., How Does “Being Real” Feel? The Experience of State Authenticity, 81 J. 
PERSONALITY 276, 285 (2013) (positing that authenticity may be precursor to positive affect); 
Leonard Reinecke & Sabine Trepte, Authenticity and Well-Being on Social Network Sites: A Two-Wave 
Longitudinal Study on the Effects of Online Authenticity and the Positivity Bias in SNS Communication, 30 
COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 95, 96 (2014) (suggesting that authenticity is a strong positive predictor 
of psychological health and well-being); Brenda K. Wiederhold, Being Authentic on Facebook Has Same 
Health Benefits as In-Person Authentic Behavior, 20 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY BEHAV. & SOC. NETWORKING 
345, 345 (2017) (noting that “contentment, calmness, and social ease were common feelings when 
one is authentic”). 
 177 See, e.g., Christopher D. Connors, The 5 Qualities of an Authentic Person, MEDIUM (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://medium.com/personal-growth/the-5-key-ingredients-of-an-authentic-person-
259914abf6d5 (listing five ways to be authentic); Diane Mottl, Ways of Living an Authentic Life, PSYCH 
CENTRAL (Oct. 8, 2018), https://psychcentral.com/lib/ways-of-living-an-authentic-life/ (advising 
readers to critically determine what they truly believe in order to become authentic). 
 178 The psychology literature, in particular, has drawn connections between feelings of authenticity 
and feelings of individual well-being, and between authentic self-presentation on social media and 
feelings of well-being.  See, e.g., Lenton et al., supra note 176, at 285 (“[A] feeling of contentment and 
comfort with oneself and with others, when combined with a sense of one’s own individuality 
(autonomy) and competence, are indicative of authenticity.”); Reinecke & Trepte, supra note 176, 
at 96 (summarizing studies that had “found strong correlations between authenticity and various 
indicators of well-being such as self-esteem, positive affect, and satisfaction with life”); id. at 100 
(proposing that “authentic self-presentation” on social media produced “positive effects on 
psychological well-being,” but users with “lower levels of well-being” benefited less and struggled 
to present their “authentic negative feelings and experiences”); Wiederhold, supra note 176, at 345 
(“[T]he field of positive psychology . . . confirms that being authentic correlates with higher levels 
of life satisfaction and well-being.”). 
 179 From the psychology literature, see, e.g., Reinecke & Trepte, supra note 176, at 96 (“‘[F]eeling real’ 
and free of psychological tension between one’s social roles and behavior and one’s true self is the 
essence of the psychological concept of authenticity.”).  From the pop-psychology literature, see, 
e.g., Mottl, supra note 177 (arguing that authenticity “is being ourselves, not an imitation of what 
we think we should be or have been told we should be” and that “[b]eing authentic is more than 
being real; it is finding what is real”). 
 180 From the psychology literature, see, e.g., Lenton et al., supra note 176, at 277 (“Theorists from the 
humanistic tradition suggest that emotions are central to authenticity because a feeling of 
authenticity signals to the individual that the self is integrated and organized.”) (citation omitted).  
From the pop-psychology literature, see, e.g., Connors, supra note 177 (“Listen to your intuition.  
Do what your heart tells you to do.  That’s what an authentic person does.”). 
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one’s acts, or “self-concordance”181; and (4) being present and engaged in the 
moment or unscripted.182  In this form of authenticity, one’s outward identity 
might not match one’s internal identity.  And, authenticity cannot be 
conferred by an outside party.183  It is worth striving for because it is self-
actualizing and personal. 
The social media industry’s “authenticity” is the opposite of this.  
According to the industry, authenticity means that you have revealed your 
one “true” identity by exposing only accurate personal details about yourself, 
for the purpose of benefiting the community.  It is not about your self-
actualization or self-expression.184  And whether or not you are authentic will 
be judged by a third-party corporation.  A graphic embedded in Facebook’s 
 
 181 From the psychology literature, see, e.g., Lenton et al., supra note 176, at 277 (finding that trait-
based and state-based authenticity have been “operationalized similarly” as “value- or trait-
behavior consistency,” sometimes labeled “self-concordance”).  From the pop-psychology 
literature, see, e.g., Connors, supra note 177 (“There’s never any doubt or questioning the integrity 
of an authentic individual.  Their behavior, in terms of ethics and morals, is as predictable as snow 
during wintertime in Minnesota.  You know what you’re going to get.”); Mottl, supra note 177 
(“Being authentic . . . is when our actions and words are congruent with our beliefs and values.”). 
 182 See, e.g., Sand Farnia, Snapchat and the Authenticity Revolution, MEDIUM (Feb. 12, 2016), 
https://medium.com/start-up-vision/snapchat-and-the-authenticity-revolution-4cd3ecb8ef26 
(describing how Snapchat felt “liberating” because “it mimicked real life, in that the moments came 
and went” and that as a result “content became more authentic. . . . Imperfection no longer 
mattered, because it was temporary, like memories”).  Psychology research has found that the state 
of feeling authentic is most closely associated with contentment, calmness, enthusiasm, and love, 
while the feeling of inauthenticity (“feeling untrue”) was associated with anxiety and public self-
consciousness.  See Lenton et al., supra note 176, at 286 (describing study finding that anxiety was 
the “signature emotion of least-me experiences” and “public self-consciousness was uniformly 
high”). 
 183 See Lenton et al., supra note 176, at 286 (highlighting that “rejection of external influence” is typically 
considered a “criteria that must be fulfilled for an individual or a behavior to be deemed 
‘authentic’”).  In the psychology literature, inauthenticity or false-self behavior has been described 
as “saying what you think others want to hear, not what you really think.”  Harter, supra note 176, 
at 382; see also id. at 383 (observing that “[t]ypically the false self is experienced as socially implanted 
against one’s will”). 
 184 Presenting your “true self” online should allow social media to better customize content for you, 
which the industry would argue is for your own benefit.  On the other hand, if (as Zuboff contends) 
the end point of surveillance capitalism is not customization but prediction (or even manipulation), 
then it is not for your benefit. 
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Community Standards webpage visually depicts “Authenticity” as an 
expressionless woman shining a light on her own face while a figure watches: 
Figure 1: “Authenticity” as Depicted by Facebook185   
In 2019, for the first time, Facebook presented authenticity as a value that 
places limits on free expression, rather than one that benefits speech.  In the 
preamble of the charter for its new Oversight Board, Facebook asserted that, 
at times, “speech can be at odds with authenticity, safety, privacy, and 
dignity.”186  This implied that authenticity is a separate, independent ethic 
or right, analogous to safety, privacy, and dignity.187  Unlike authenticity, 
however, these other things are individual rights—basic human rights, in 
fact.188  Authenticity is not generally considered a human right on par with 
safety, privacy, or dignity.189  This may be because, in the conventional 
understanding, authenticity comes from within, and must be secured by each 
individual for him- or herself.190  The statement in Facebook’s Oversight 
 
 185 Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2020).  
 186 OVERSIGHT BOARD CHARTER, supra note 37, at 2. 
 187 The implication was made clearer in a letter by Mark Zuckerberg, which Facebook posted online 
with the Charter, to “explain[] the board’s purpose and goals.”  Brent Harris, Establishing Structure 
and Governance for an Independent Oversight Board, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/09/oversight-board-structure/.  Zuckerberg wrote that 
when Facebook enforces its Community Standards, “we follow a set of values—authenticity, safety, 
privacy, and dignity—guided by international human rights standards.”  Mark Zuckerberg, 
Facebook’s Commitment to the Oversight Board, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/letter-from-mark-zuckerberg-on-oversight-
board-charter.pdf.  Although Zuckerberg’s statement suggests that authenticity is a value connected 
to human rights, authenticity is not a widely recognized human-rights concept. 
 188 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (declaring 
safety (Article 3), privacy (Article 12), and dignity (Article 1) to be human rights). 
 189 Thus, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not mention authenticity, 
though it does refer to obligations of the state to create conditions in which an individual’s “full 
personality” may be “developed.”  Id. art. 29. 
 190 Note that insofar as the other values (safety, privacy, and dignity) operate to limit speech, they limit 
the speech of others.  For example, the law might limit someone else’s speech to preserve my safety.  
However, when authenticity operates to limit speech, it limits one’s own speech.  In order to preserve 
my authenticity, I (or a social media company) must limit my own (inauthentic) speech. 
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Board Charter offers yet a different view of authenticity—a reminder of how 
the industry’s concept of authenticity is continually changing.191   
This Part examines the social media industry’s claim that speaker 
authenticity is an important “value”—morally, pragmatically, and 
expressively.  It concludes that speaker authenticity can have unique value for 
online communication, where people never come face to face.  But when 
“authenticity” is used in this sense, it generally refers to truthfulness about 
specific details of a person’s identity that are relevant to the person’s speech—
not a broad obligation to present a single, “true” identity through myriad 
accurate data points.  This Part finds little support for the claim that 
authenticity in the industry sense is morally virtuous.  It finds mixed support 
for the claim that authenticity cuts down on abusive behaviors, with some 
research suggesting that abusive speech can increase when speakers are forced 
to disclose their identities.  And it notes some reasons in favor of authenticity 
regulation that social media companies do not tend to bring up: not only the 
business value of authenticity, explored at length in Part I, but also that identity-
based take-downs are necessary to prevent fraud and other crimes, such as 
foreign election interference, and are therefore essential to digital security.  It 
discusses two other ways in which authenticity regulation benefits companies 
as business entities—by helping them avoid intrusive government regulation 
and protect their legal interests.   
After considering these arguments, this Part considers some 
counterarguments.  For example, authenticity regulation tends to legitimize 
speech from “authentic” speakers no matter its content, teaching that only 
speakers are bad, not ideas.  Authenticity regulation treats anonymous or 
pseudonymous speech as if it has little or no value, which runs counter to 
long-held American free-speech commitments to pseudonymous political 
speech.  Companies’ efforts to treat inauthentic identity as a behavior may 
place significant “New Governor” scrutiny on individuals’ associations.  
Micro-targeting shapes discourse without listeners’ knowledge or consent.  
And there is an orwellian vagueness to the term “authenticity” when 
companies use it; unmoored from its socially constructed meaning (self-
actualization), authenticity can mean anything.  When content is treated as 
evidence of (in)authenticity, authenticity rules can operate as a form of quasi-
content moderation.   
 
 191 The word “authenticity” appears only once in the Charter, in the quoted sentence.  OVERSIGHT 
BOARD CHARTER, supra note 37, at 2. 
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A rigorous regulatory focus on authenticity encourages identity theft, 
creating ripple effects across the economy.  In general, identity theft crimes 
have been increasing in the United States.192  The increase in identity theft 
incentivizes companies to partner with law enforcement, a process that has 
been underway in earnest for years.  The ensuing arms race—waged 
between sophisticated identity thieves and a state-private coalition—likely 
accelerates line-blurring between state surveillance and private surveillance, 
as well as state and private power.193  This concern is related to the 
commodification of authentic identity, as verified by Facebook and other 
social media companies.  Authenticity regulation makes an authentic identity 
a precious possession, and its verification a valuable service.  Identity 
verification barely existed as a marketable service a few years ago; in the 
future, social media companies may generate significant value from this new 
line of business.   
In sum, this Article disagrees that authentic speaker identity is a core 
value of free expression, at least as it is conceptualized by the social media 
industry.  And it finds more risks than benefits to authenticity regulation, 
especially considering that content-based moderation can do much of the 
work necessary to keep networks secure from crime, misinformation, and so 
on.  All this suggests that we should be skeptical of authenticity—as a moral 
precept, a speech value, and a stand-in for “authentic content”—as we move 
forward with online content moderation and speech regulation.   
A.  Bad Actors, Revisited 
1.  Is it Immoral to Disguise Your Identity? 
In an interview, Mark Zuckerberg once emphatically repeated “[y]ou 
have one identity,” three times in a single minute, impressing the interviewer 
with his moral zeal for the company’s authenticity rules.194  Of course, 
Zuckerberg spoke as a young, wealthy, white, healthy, cisgender, 
 
 192 See ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 251147, 
VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2016, at 2 (2019), available at https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/vit16.pdf (noting an increase in the prevalence of identity theft from 7% in 2014 to 10% 
in 2016). 
 193 Mark Zuckerberg has repeatedly referred to cybersecurity at Facebook as an “arms race.”  See, e.g., 
Facebook: Transparency and Use of Consumer Data: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 105th 
Cong. 209 (2018) (statement of Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Facebook), 
available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20180411/108090/HHRG-115-IF00-
Transcript-20180411.pdf (“Every problem around security is sort of an arms race, right?”). 
 194 DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT 199–200 (2010). 
 
May 2020] BAD ACTORS 667 
heterosexual, man from an upper-middle-class East Coast family, who had 
attended prestigious schools and was celebrated for his entrepreneurial 
success.  Unlike many Facebook users, he possessed few identity 
characteristics that make people targets for abuse or discrimination.195   
Zuckerberg’s presentation of authenticity as a moral virtue was 
insensitive to the reasons that other people might want to hide aspects of their 
identity when they communicate online.196  Those reasons abound.  For 
example, research has shown that women and people of color—and 
particularly women of color—endure more abuse in online communication 
than men and white people.197  For vulnerable speakers, rules that require 
them to be honest about their identities are a double-edged sword: in some 
speech settings, the disclosure might affirm a connection to a community, 
with positive effects on that person’s self-expression, and on the community’s 
conversation.198  In other situations, however, the disclosure can affect 
listeners’ evaluation of the person’s speech (prompting listeners to treat it as 
less important or intelligent, for example), or mark the speaker for abuse.  It 
seems reasonable for a speaker to try to avoid discrimination or abuse—or 
to try to have her expressive contributions taken equally as seriously as those 
 
 195 Zuckerberg is Jewish, and has been the target of anti-Semitic abuse, however.  See, e.g., German Paper 
Ripped For ‘Anti-Semitic’ Caricature of Facebook’s Zuckerberg, FOX NEWS (Dec. 11, 2015), 
https://www.foxnews.com/world/german-paper-ripped-for-anti-semitic-caricature-of-facebooks-
zuckerberg. 
 196 Indeed, something else may help explain Zuckerberg’s passion for authenticity.  Some psychological 
research has found that “simply being primed with power makes people feel more authentic.”  
Lenton et al., supra note 176, at 286 (citing Michael W. Kraus, Serena Chen & Dacher Keltner, The 
Power to Be Me: Power Elevates Self-Concept Consistency and Authenticity, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 974 (2011)).  Since Zuckerberg enjoyed significant social power—defined as “elevated 
control over others’ outcomes and increased freedom to make decisions according to [his] own 
goals and motivations”—as a millionaire CEO, this research suggests that he may have felt greater-
than-average “self-concept consistency” and authenticity.  Michael W. Kraus, Serena Chen & 
Dacher Keltner, The Power to Be Me: Power Elevates Self-Concept Consistency and Authenticity, 47 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 974, 974 (2011). 
 197 See, e.g., Emma A. Jane, Online Misogyny and Feminist Digilantism, 30 CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & 
CULTURAL STUD. 284, 284 (2016) (“[M]edia accounts and self-reports of sexualized electronic 
vitriol present a strong prima facie case that gendered cyber-hate has increased markedly since at 
least 2011.”); Toxic Twitter—A Toxic Place for Women, AMNESTY INT’L, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2018/03/online-violence-against-women-chapter-
1/ (pointing to Twitter as an example of a social platform where women of color endure abuse).  
See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) (exploring the effect 
of cyber harassment, noting that it particularly affects women of color); Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s 
Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2009) (arguing that the 
gender discrimination law may help combat cyber gender harassment). 
 198 See supra Part II.A.2 (describing how online authenticity enables speakers to create targeted 
communities). 
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of other speakers—by disguising a component of her identity.  And it seems 
unfair—and arguably even immoral—for social media networks to forbid 
vulnerable users from engaging in self-protection from these foreseeable 
harms.   
Even putting aside discrimination and abuse, a person may be morally 
justified in obscuring aspects of her identity, or even deceiving others about 
her identity, if doing so preserves her privacy or dignity or allows her to better 
express her true self.  If it is morally virtuous to “be authentic” for the benefit 
of others, this refers to being truthful toward others in your speech, which is 
the moral virtue of truthfulness.  But social media companies do not want to 
present truthfulness as an important value for online speech, because they do 
not want to be “arbiters of truth.”199   
Social media companies that rely on authenticity enforcement offer little 
to users who, for various reasons, seek out online communication as a relief 
from the daily grind of in-person bias.  And surely deceptive action is 
warranted to thwart a system which will attribute to you characteristics and 
qualities, such as political valence200 or health status201, against your wishes, 
to turn a profit for someone else.  For all of these reasons, Zuckerberg’s moral 
claims about authenticity fall short.   
2.  Authenticity and Trust 
Social media companies assert that authenticity improves speech by 
encouraging meaningful connections through trust.  This argument is more 
persuasive.  There really are ways in which authenticity (in the industry sense) 
can enhance trust in communication.  One is when part of a speaker’s 
identity sheds light on the truthfulness of their speech.  For example, if a 
person has never served in the military, the person can hardly claim to have 
 
 199 Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Nov. 18, 2016, 12:15 AM), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/
posts/10103269806149061?mod=article_inline (“We do not want to be arbiters of truth . . . .”). 
 200 See Jeremy B. Merrill, Liberal, Moderate, or Conservative? See How Facebook Labels You, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/us/politics/facebook-ads-politics.html (“And 
now, it is easy to find out how Facebook has characterized you—as very liberal or very 
Conservative, or somewhere in between.”); Michael D. Conover et al., Predicting the Political Alignment 
of Twitter Users, 3 IEEE INT’L CONF. ON SOC. COMPUTING 192, 198 (2011), available at 
http://www.bgoncalves.com/download/finish/4/53.html (“[P]olitically-active Twitters users 
generate text- and network-based information that can be used to effectively predict the political 
alignment of large numbers of individuals.”). 
 201 See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html (describing how a 
company uses data about your health status to deploy targeted advertisements). 
 
May 2020] BAD ACTORS 669 
experienced something as a member of the military.  If the person’s lack of 
military service was known to their audience, it would affect how the 
audience evaluates the truthfulness of the person’s speech.202   
Online communication presents real challenges for speakers and listeners 
negotiating authenticity.  In digital space, it can be difficult to confirm that 
you are communicating with someone who is who they say they are or to 
verify speakers’ claims.203  Catfishing, for example, is a widespread online 
practice in which one person tricks another about his or her identity, 
sometimes as part of a fraudulent scam.204  Catfishing is mainly known for 
causing economic and even physical harm to victims, but it also causes 
expressive harm by causing people to mistrust online communication.  
The question is whether companies’ enforcement of authenticity really 
makes speech trustworthy by reducing false content and misrepresentations.  
Surely it must in some cases.  When companies remove fake accounts, they 
prevent those accounts from spreading false information and committing 
fraud.  However, social media websites are still filled with misrepresentations, 
exaggeration, and outright fraud.  Authenticity regulation likely reduces this 
problem, but it has not proven particularly well-tailored to eliminate it.   
Another reason that authenticity might matter to speech involves 
expressive communities.  Some people derive significant expressive 
satisfaction from participating in online forums comprised of people who 
share something in common: working dads, for example, or struggling 
musicians.  One of the unique benefits of social media networks is that they 
can bring together a group of geographically dispersed individuals who all 
share interests or characteristics.  Facebook, for example, has numerous 
public Facebook groups on various subjects, and people enjoy these forums 
for expression.205  In a community-based speech forum, participants may feel 
 
 202 In 2018, a Texas man gave interviews to the news media with a first-hand account of a school 
shooting.  Texas Man Said He Was a Survivor of the Santa Fe High School Shooting, He Was Lying, NPR 
(July 3, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/03/738586985/texas-man-said-he-was-a-survivor-
of-the-santa-fe-high-school-shooting-he-was-ly.  The man said he was a substitute teacher at a high 
school where ten people were killed by a gunman.  Id.  But it turned out that the man had never 
worked for the school.  Id.  A reporter discovered the lie and debunked the man’s story, revealing 
in the process that many news outlets had not verified important facts about the man’s identity.  Id.   
 203 It can also be challenging to negotiate authenticity in the real world.  See United States v. Alvarez, 
567 U.S. 709, 713 (2012) (analyzing a case involving a man who lied about being a famous hockey 
player, marrying a Mexican starlet, and receiving the Congressional Medal of Honor).  
 204 See, e.g., Jack Nicas, Facebook Connected Her to a Tattooed Soldier in Iraq. Or So She Thought., N.Y. TIMES 
(July 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/28/technology/facebook-military-scam.html. 
 205 Private Facebook groups introduce a moderator who gives permission for participants to join, and 
therefore, assumes the task of authenticating members. 
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freer to express themselves because they believe they are communicating 
only with people with whom they share something in common.  And, they 
may credit the other participants’ speech more on the basis of this 
commonality.  Since one of the main benefits of the Internet is to foster this 
unique kind of connection across great distances—bringing the world 
together, in Facebook’s motto206—we can say that authenticity offers real 
value for this kind of online communication.   
But when we say that authenticity adds value to such communications, 
do we mean that speakers must present only accurate details about 
themselves online, with no deceptions (or obfuscations) about their “true” 
identity?  Probably not.  For example, if you belong to a Facebook group for 
working dads, it is probably important that you really are a working father.  
But is it important for others in the group to know your race, your zip code, 
or your educational background?  No.  Is it important for Facebook to know 
these things?  Not for the specific purpose of ensuring that the working dads 
forum is limited to participants who really are working dads.   
What all this suggests is that where authenticity has value for speech, it is 
really functioning as a stand-in for the truthfulness of specific claims.  It is not 
necessary to be authentic in the industry sense—to reveal a wealth of 
accurate details about yourself for others to consume.  Nor is it necessary to 
be authentic in the conventional sense—being true to yourself, consistent in 
your beliefs and actions, self-aware, and unscripted (i.e., not generally 
“phony”).  It just matters if it is true that you are a working dad.   
3.  Authenticity and Anti-Social Behavior 
Many participants in the technology industry believe that online 
anonymity facilitates “anti-social behavior,” such as hate speech, 
harassment, and trolling.207  In fact, little research has explored the 
 
 206 See Sarah Frier & Max Chafkin, Zuckerberg’s New Mission for Facebook: Bringing the World Closer, 
BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-22/zucker
berg-s-new-mission-for-facebook-bringing-the-world-closer. 
 207 See, e.g., Lee Rainie, Janna Anderson & Jonathan Albright, The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity 
and Fake News Online, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.pewinternet.org/
2017/03/29/the-future-of-free-speech-trolls-anonymity-and-fake-news-online/ (noting that 
“anonymity abets anti-social behavior” was a theme expressed by respondents in a 2016 survey of 
technology experts, scholars, corporate practitioners and government leaders); The Twitter Paradox: 
How a Platform Designed for Free Speech Enables Internet Trolls, NPR (Oct. 26, 2016), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/10/26/499442453/the-twitter-paradox-how-a-platform-designed-fo
r-free-speech-enables-internet-tro (“Facebook has its own problems with abuse and harassment but 
not nearly to the same degree [as other social media networks] because there’s no way for people 
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relationship between speaker anonymity and uncivil or aggressive online 
speech.208  The evidence that exists is mixed, with some recent studies 
finding, contrary to the conventional wisdom, that the most aggressive social 
media speech comes from individuals operating under their real names.209  
For example, a 2014 study of a German social media platform found that 
commenters operating under their real names presented more online 
aggression than commenters whose identities were anonymous.210  The 
researchers hypothesized that this might be because operating under their 
 
to sort of hide behind an anonymous account name or an anonymous avatar”).  But see Katja Rost, 
Lea Stahel & Bruno S. Frey, Digital Social Norm Enforcement: Online Firestorms in Social Media, 11 PLOS 
ONE, no. 6, June 7, 2016, at 1 (arguing that non-anonymous individuals are more aggressive in 
unleashing what the authors call “online firestorms” than their anonymous counterparts).  
 208 See Arthur D. Santana, Virtuous or Vitriolic: The Effect of Anonymity on Civility in Online Newspaper Reader 
Comment Boards, 8 JOURNALISM PRAC. 18, 18 (2014) (noting “a striking dearth of empirical evidence 
in the academic literature of the effect that anonymity has on commenters’ behavior” on online 
newspaper comment boards). 
 209 See, e.g., Mikyeung Bae, The Effects of Anonymity on Computer-Mediated Communication: The Case of 
Independent Versus Interdependent Self-Construal Influence, 55 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 300, 305 (2016) 
(studying U.S. and South Korean undergraduates in online discussion forums and finding “no 
significant effects of anonymity on flaming or critical comments” among subjects and that 
“identifiable participants exhibited more critical comments than did anonymous participants,”—a 
finding that “is contrary to popular belief that anonymity enhances disinhibitive behavior”); Katja 
Rost, Lea Stahel & Bruno S. Frey, Digital Social Norm Enforcement: Online Firestorms in Social Media, 11 
PLOS ONE, no. 6, June 7, 2016, at 1, 6, 18 (using a large dataset study of a German social media 
platform and finding that “more online aggression” was demonstrated by non-anonymous 
commenters, potentially because “[n]on-anonymity helps to gain recognition, increases one’s 
persuasive power, and mobilizes followers”); see also Daegon Cho & K. Hazel Kwon, The Impacts of 
Identity Verification and Disclosure of Social Cues on Flaming in Online User Comments, 51 COMPUTERS HUM. 
BEHAV. 363 (2015) (demonstrating that policy-driven regulation that increases the likelihood users 
will be readily identified in online forums actually increases online animosity); Charlene Christie & 
Emily Dill, Evaluating Peers in Cyberspace: The Impact of Anonymity, 55 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 292, 
292, 297 (2016) (“Only those participants with high self-esteem, low levels of social anxiousness, or 
an elevated sense of autonomy evaluated targets more negatively when anonymous rather than 
identifiable,” while “the opposite pattern emerged among people with elevated social anxiousness”).  
But see Ian Rowe, Civility 2.0: A Comparative Analysis of Incivility in Online Political Discussion, 18 INFO., 
COMM. & SOC. 121, 121 (2015) (finding that political comments on the Washington Post’s website, 
where users enjoy a high level of anonymity, were more uncivil than responses to political news 
content on the Washington Post’s Facebook page, where there is less anonymity); Arthur D. Santana, 
Virtuous or Vitriolic: The Effect of Anonymity on Civility in Online Newspaper Reader Comment Boards, 8 
JOURNALISM PRAC. 18, 28 (2014) (finding that there is a dramatic improvement in civility when 
anonymity is removed).  An excellent, though somewhat dated, review of the social science 
literature about the relationship between online behavior and anonymity is Kimberly M. 
Christopherson, The Positive and Negative Implications of Anonymity in Internet Social Interactions: “On the 
Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Dog,” 23 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 3038 (2007).  Another summary 
of the mixed evidence can be found in Chris Baraniuk, End of Anonymity, 220 NEW SCIENTIST 34 
(2013). 
 210 See Arthur D. Santana, Virtuous or Vitriolic: The Effect of Anonymity on Civility in Online Newspaper Reader 
Comment Boards, 8 JOURNALISM PRAC. 18 (2014). 
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real names helped aggressive users gain recognition, increase their 
“persuasive power,” and mobilize followers.211  This seems consistent with 
the rise of prominent media personalities who engage in online provocations 
under their “true” identities, including Alex Jones, Richard Spencer, and 
Milo Yiannopoulos.212   
The current climate on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other social 
media sites is full of bad behavior, even while these companies employ 
various forms of authenticity enforcement.213  As danah boyd observed in 
2012, “both Facebook and face-to-face settings continue to be rife with 
meanness and cruelty.”214  Over time, claims that authenticity is a value 
which encourages people to behave responsibly online—and that we must 
all “be authentic” so we can collectively reap the benefits of a more civil 
internet—have failed to match our real-world experiences with social media.   
4.  Authenticity and Crime 
Social media companies rarely discuss authenticity enforcement as a way 
to get criminals off their networks.  This may be because companies are 
reluctant to remind users that their networks are full of criminals.  
Nonetheless, authenticity enforcement likely helps reduce fraud, foreign 
election interference, and other crimes.  Facebook has sued some of its own 
users under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) for operating 
scams that steal users’ data.215  In fact, some aspects of the CFAA have likely 
encouraged companies to track users’ identities.216   
 
 211 Id. 
 212 See, e.g., Ben Schreckinger, The Alt-Right Comes to Washington, POLITICO (Jan.–Feb. 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/alt-right-trump-washington-dc-power-
milo-214629 (describing the presence of Alt-Right personalities in online chatrooms, Twitter, and 
spaces on the Internet). 
 213 See Bill Reader, Free Press vs. Free Speech? The Rhetoric of “Civility” in Regard to Anonymous Online Comments, 
89 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 495, 506 (2012) (observing that “the undesirable impoliteness 
and rudeness found in many online forums appears to accurately reflect the state of the culture, or 
at least the dominant voices in the culture”). 
 214 danah boyd, The Politics of “Real Names,” 55 COMMS. ACM 29, 30 (2012). 
 215 See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (CFAA), Pub. L. No. 
98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92 (1984). 
 216 The law prohibits “unauthorized access” to a computer.  Id.; see Thomas E. Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 
99 TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (critiquing cyber-trespass laws like the CFAA that give online 
platforms gatekeeper rights to block external research); Thomas E. Kadri, Platforms as Blackacres, 68 
UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (outlining possible First Amendment challenges to using cyber-
trespass laws to shield online platforms from external scrutiny).  Years ago, companies may have 
developed identity-policing tools in part to preserve their legal options under the CFAA.  The use 
of a false identity in violation of a platform’s terms of service might establish unauthorized access, 
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The underlying concern, however, is criminal conduct, not identity 
violations.  Some criminals hijack strangers’ accounts, falsely assuming their 
targets’ identities in the process.  These people present “inauthentic identity,” 
but they are bad actors in an intuitively criminal sense: they have stolen 
someone’s identity.  In other cases, criminals create fictitious identities for the 
purpose of engaging in crimes like fraud.  What is wrong about this behavior 
is not that the individual is claiming a false identity, but rather that they are 
committing crimes.   
On the other end of the spectrum, as previously noted, some people, 
including transgender individuals and human rights activists, choose 
identities that violate authenticity rules as a form of self-expression, or to 
protect themselves from harm.  Others, like low-income people and 
undocumented immigrants, have “inauthenticity” foisted upon them.  These 
individuals are not committing crimes, but they pay a price when they are 
caught in violation of authenticity requirements.   
5.  Collaborating with the State, Forestalling Regulation 
Authenticity policies give companies significant power to connect the 
identities of speakers on their networks to real-world identities—a useful 
power for collaborations between companies and law enforcement.  By 
exploiting their ability to provide law enforcement with specific, identifying 
information about targeted individuals, companies may shore up support 
from public institutions or the public, and reduce calls for regulation.217  
Collaboration between private companies and law enforcement is explored 
in more length in the next subsection.   
* * * 
 
and some scholars have taken the position that unauthorized access can be established if a user 
returns to a service after having been kicked off.  See, e.g., Orin Kerr, More Thoughts on the Six CFAA 
Scenarios About Authorized Access vs. Unauthorized Access, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://volokh.com/2013/01/28/more-thoughts-on-the-six-cfaa-scenarios-about-authorized-acce
ss-vs-unauthorized-access/ (positing that “future accesses” are unauthorized under the CFAA 
where a person was previously banned).  Where liability is only created upon the creation of a 
follow-on (presumably false) account or identity, authenticity regulation may be essential to help 
companies establish the repeat offense and identify wrongdoers to pursue.  In other words, 
authenticity regulation may help companies protect their legal rights in ways that content-based 
regulation does not. 
 217 See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform Governance: Private Power in the Shadow of the State, 72 
SMU L. REV. 27, 32 (2019) (“[A]s the Internet grew and became commercialized, platforms 
became increasingly susceptible to government control and pressure to extend the reach of local 
law.”). 
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This Section has examined the industry’s own claims about why 
authenticity matters to speech, and it finds that some of them have merit.  In 
particular, inauthenticity is a speech problem in two main situations: when a 
speaker has lied about an identity attribute that bears on the truthfulness of 
her speech, and when a speaker has lied about an identity attribute to 
participate in an expressive community from which she would otherwise be 
excluded.  In these situations, authenticity regulation would produce benefits 
to others (not to the speaker herself).  Also, in general, people may feel that a 
network is more trustworthy when people operate under “real” identities, 
and that a network is less trustworthy when there are many pseudonymous 
accounts.  Certainly, the social media industry, by treating authenticity as an 
important value, encourages users to hold these beliefs.  But is authenticity a 
moral value?  No.  Is it effective at reducing abuse, discrimination, and 
harassment online?  Perhaps not.  Does it help identify criminals?  Some, but 
it is both under- and over-inclusive.   
B.  Has Authenticity Been Oversold? 
1.  The Value of Anonymous and Pseudonymous Speech 
Authenticity regulation prohibits “false identity” alongside anonymous 
and pseudonymous identity (although some companies, like Twitter, allow 
pseudonymous accounts).218  And as we have seen, companies sometimes 
justify this approach on the ground that “authentic” speakers produce 
“authentic content,” which implies that content produced by authentic 
speakers is truthful and good.219   
The industry’s rejection of anonymous and pseudonymous speech 
represents a significant break from norms of American political 
 
 218 Of course, “false” identity is not the same thing as “anonymous” or “pseudonymous” identity.  False 
identity conveys the understanding that the speaker has engaged in deception, claiming attributes 
that do not truthfully apply.   
 219 Facebook’s Community Standards now state that authenticity is an important value for the 
company because Facebook “want[s] to make sure the content people are seeing on Facebook is 
authentic.” Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2020).  The sentence conflates authentic content with authentic identity, 
implying that a person who presents an authentic identity produces authentic content.  This is a 
semantic trick, because many people would understand “authentic content” to mean that the 
substance of the content is genuine, true, or accurate—not just that it comes from a speaker 
operating under his or her real identity.  
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discourse220—and free speech jurisprudence221—which have long recognized 
value in anonymous and pseudonymous speech.222  A recent example is the 
New York Times’ 2018 publication of an anonymous op-ed, authored by an 
unidentified member of the Trump Administration, which shed light on the 
internal workings of the presidential administration.223  The fact that 
Americans sometimes find anonymous and pseudonymous political 
expression to be valuable and trustworthy—and that Americans have 
centuries of experience at evaluating the credibility of anonymous and 
pseudonymous speech—highlights how private authenticity regulation is 
challenging longstanding free speech values.224   
Two traditions have expressed the purpose of free speech in First 
Amendment jurisprudence: a liberal tradition, which emphasizes the 
individual’s right to expressive liberty, and a republican tradition, which 
 
 220 See Alfred York, Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Deliberation: Why Not Everything Should Be Connected, 26 J. 
POL. PHIL. 169, 172 (2018) (“Writing under an assumed name or no name at all has long been 
practiced in domains ranging from literature to philosophy to political argument; indeed, the set of 
essays published under the pseudonym ‘Publius’ count among the most notable contributions to 
American political thought and underpinned public debate on the ratification of the United States 
Constitution.”). 
 221 See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1538 (2007) (“[T]he First Amendment, as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court, confers upon authors a right to speak anonymously or pseudonymously, 
even when doing so interferes with audiences’ attempts to decode their messages.”); MacIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holding that a statute that prohibited anonymous 
political or campaign literature unconstitutional). 
 222 There is a significant literature on anonymity and speech.  Unfortunately, a rich and detailed 
treatment of the subject is outside the scope of this Article.  This Subsection focuses on the value of 
anonymity and pseudonymity for political discourse, but anonymity is well-recognized for its 
importance to artistic expression and the expression of self (i.e., authenticity in the social psychology 
sense).  See, e.g., Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free Speech, and Cyberspace, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 163 (2003) (“[R]estrictions on anonymity uniquely affect ‘closeted’ 
lesbians, gay men, and other sexual minorities.”). 
 223 Opinion, I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-resistance.html. 
 224 For a summary of the benefits and drawbacks of anonymity and pseudonymity in discourse, see 
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1537, 1559–77 (2007).  After thoroughly summarizing the pros and cons, the authors 
argue that, in public law, assuming more speech is better than less speech, and that listeners are 
“largely rational and capable of self-governance,” a “constitutional privilege” in favor of 
anonymous and pseudonymous speech is preferable to a presumption against it.  Id. at 1577, 1589–
90.  In online discourse, both assumptions are less clearly true; the volume of online posts and tweets 
is vast (so more speech may not be better than less), and the presentation of information on social 
media may make it particularly difficult for listeners to discern signals of reliability.   
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promotes public values and self-government.225  Speaker anonymity or 
pseudonymity is not a problem in the liberal tradition, since the speaker 
retains the power to express her identity as she sees fit.  In fact, speaker 
anonymity or pseudonymity likely enhances expressive liberty, since some 
individuals will feel freer to express themselves under an assumed identity.226   
Speaker anonymity or pseudonymity does create potential problems 
under the republican tradition, however, insofar as a link exists between 
anonymity or pseudonymity and false and misleading content, which would 
undermine collective self-government.  But people operating under their 
“true” identities spread false and misleading content all the time.227  This 
highlights the misfit between authenticity enforcement and the potential 
harms of inauthenticity which are offered to justify it.  If the core problems 
are crime, abusive speech, and false and misleading content, solutions should 
be tailored to fit those problems.  Conventional speech norms also trust 
listeners to assess anonymous and pseudonymous speech as they see fit, 
rather than encourage them to defer to a third-party decider.228   
2.  Is All Authentic Speech of Equal Worth? 
Authenticity regulation gives a green light to speakers who are willing to 
“own” offensive or false content, and treats the content of the speech of all 
“authentic” speakers as having roughly equal value (i.e., equally deserving of 
 
 225 See Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech 
Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1404–09 (2017) (examining the two traditions of speech 
jurisprudence).   
 226 On the other hand, anonymity and pseudonymity might chill speech if it enables trolling and 
harassment that silences them.  But, as we saw, supra Part III.A, the evidence on this is mixed. 
 227 Speakers operating under their “real” identities routinely circulate misinformation on social media.  
In 2019, for example, Twitter’s Chief Executive Officer, Jack Dorsey, caused controversy by 
tweeting out praise of Ben Greenfield, a prominent (and verified) health podcaster who is known 
for his anti-vaccine tweets.  See, e.g., Julia Alexander, Jack Dorsey’s Endorsement of Anti-Vax Podcaster 
Highlights Twitter’s Misinformation Problem, VERGE (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/3/13/18264196/jack-dorsey-anti-vax-ben-greenfield-twitter-facebook-youtube-amazon-co
nspiracy (reporting the controversy surrounding Jack Dorsey’s tweet); Ben Greenfield 
@bengreenfield, TWITTER (Feb. 11, 2019, 7:49 AM), https://twitter.com/bengreenfield/
status/1094986690785988613? (“Vaccines do indeed cause autism . . . .”); see also Alexandria 
Neason, On Twitter, News Outlets Amplify Trump’s False Statements: Study, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 
(May 3, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/politics/twitter-media-trump.php (discussing the spread of 
false and misleading statements made on Twitter by President Donald J. Trump). 
 228 See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 224, at 1539 (noting that “audiences are likely to discount the value 
of nonattributed speech, thus mitigating some (but not all) of anonymous speech’s potential harm”). 
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protection from censorship).229  By not addressing the content of the offensive 
speech directly, companies fail to communicate that some authentic speech 
is false, misleading, degrading, or abusive.   
Fundamentally, authenticity regulation teaches that it’s not the content 
of speech that is objectionable, it’s the person who is doing the speaking.  Speech 
communicated by one actor might be a violation—while the very same 
content, communicated by a different actor, is perfectly fine.  For example, 
on Facebook, only an inauthentic speaker who says dehumanizing things 
about homeless children is doing anything wrong.230  An authentic speaker 
communicating the same content is not violating Facebook’s rules, and is not 
treated as blameworthy.  This approach to objectionable speech is quite 
different from the approach in First Amendment law, which has generally 
acknowledged that some speech is both objectionable and protected from 
censorship.  In addition, the industry’s take on objectionable speech—hate 
the speaker, not the speech—gets the merits exactly backwards.  The 
substance of the speech—in the example offered above, dehumanizing 
homeless children—is the problem.  The person expressing the hateful content 
may be capable of rehabilitation.   
The problem goes beyond “normalization.”  By choosing to tolerate 
noxious speech produced by “authentic” speakers, companies permit such 
speakers to leverage the companies’ powerful communicative technology.  
This gives those speakers the ability to integrate their ideas into the industry’s 
machine learning; to pay to “push” their ideas into others’ news feeds; and 
to employ identity-based targeting and exclusions to maximize the persuasive 
effect of their speech (and their advertising dollars).  For example, Facebook’s 
choice to provide a platform for racists who are willing to “own” their racism 
may indeed make racism seem normal and acceptable.  However, it also 
provides a channel to deliver racist ideas in a way designed to achieve 
maximum persuasion, and to inject racist expression into Facebook’s 
machine intelligence, where it affects pattern recognition and influences 
future customization and expression.   
 
 229 See Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=p (last visited Apr. 1, 
2020) (“When people stand behind their opinions and actions, our community is safer and more 
accountable.”). 
 230 Facebook’s content rules prohibit dehumanizing speech against only some groups.  These do not 
include either children or the homeless.  See Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.faceb
ook.com/communitystandards/objectionable_content (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).  
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3.  Inauthentic Behavior 
Part I documented Facebook’s original practice of defining authenticity 
in terms of a person’s “real” or “true” identity, and its recent move to 
redefine authenticity in terms of behavior.  Under the new approach, a 
person can present her “true” identity on Facebook and yet still run afoul of 
its authenticity rules.  Coordinated inauthentic behavior is “when multiple 
accounts—including both fake and authentic accounts—work together to 
mislead people.”231  Deceitful behavior is what puts a user in violation of 
Facebook’s rules against coordinated inauthentic behavior.  Facebook has 
been very clear that it is “taking down these Pages and accounts based on 
their behavior, not the content they post.”232   
The factors that Facebook considers relevant to evaluating the 
“authenticity” of behavior mainly relate to speech and association.  As 
Facebook’s General Counsel testified in October 2017, “[o]ur systems 
examine thousands of account attributes and focus on detecting behaviors 
that are very difficult for bad actors to fake, including their connections to 
others on our platform.”233  Facebook has said that it “can find links between 
accounts that might be coordinating an information operation based on how 
they interact on Facebook or other technical signals that link the accounts 
together.”234  Essentially, the company looks for points of association between 
a suspected bad actor and other accounts.235  In October 2018, for example, 
 
 231 Testimony of Sheryl Sandberg, supra note 48, at 3.  Sandberg explained that coordinated 
inauthentic behavior “is not allowed because we don’t want organizations or individuals creating 
networks of accounts that misinform people about who they are or what they’re doing.”  Id.  
 232 Nathaniel Gleicher, Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior from Russia, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM 
(Jan. 17, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/01/removing-cib-from-russia/. 
 233 Testimony of Colin Stretch, supra note 2, at 3. 
 234 Nathaniel Gleicher, More Information about Last Week’s Takedowns, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Nov. 13, 
2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/11/last-weeks-takedowns/. 
 235 The Digital Forensic Research Lab, which has studied coordinated inauthentic behavior, has 
focused on the “pattern of connections” between accounts and pages in evaluating authenticity.  
Dig. Forensic Res. Lab, Facebook’s Sputnik Takedown—In Depth, MEDIUM (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebooks-sputnik-takedown-in-depth-f417bed5b2f8.  “Cross-post-
ing” is an example.  In January 2019, Facebook removed accounts and pages on the basis of 
coordinated inauthentic behavior.  Among the behaviors that implicated the accounts and pages in 
coordinated inauthentic behavior was cross-posting of videos.  Id.  The Digital Forensic Research 
Lab has written that cross-posting “proves that there is a relationship between two pages,” which 
serves as a basis for finding coordinated inauthentic behavior.  Id.  (On Facebook, accounts “can 
only cross-post one another’s content if both agree to it or if they already have an administrator or 
manager in common” and “@DFRLab identified different patterns of cross-posting and sharing 
videos between” Pages implicated in the coordinate inauthentic behavior).  Different Pages that 
upload the same videos separately also raise behavioral flags.  Id.  And Facebook has pointed to 
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after Facebook banned Gavin McInnes, the founder of a reputed hate group, 
for violations of its hate speech policies, it proceeded to remove “both 
individual accounts and pages, as well as associated groups, that [were] 
affiliated” with the group online.236  Facebook has also charged users with 
employing coordinated inauthentic behavior “where a Page name was 
changed after it had built up a large following, substantially changing the 
Page’s subject matter.”237   
In August 2018, Facebook removed a number of accounts and Pages, 
citing coordinated inauthentic behavior, including Pages run by American 
anti-racism activists.238  Facebook said that it had “observed links” between 
Russian propaganda groups and a group that created a Facebook event Page 
for an anti-racism rally in Washington D.C.239  The event, however, was real.  
Smash Racism, a grass-roots organization that co-sponsored the rally, issued 
a statement that said, in part: 
Facebook’s removal of the page in question is censorship against the real 
movement against white supremacy and fascism.  The only evidence 
connecting our page to Russia/the Internet Research Institute is a single 
admin account for the Resisters, which was an admin for 7 minutes.  All 
other evidence (such as use of VPNs and sock accounts) represent common 
practices for anti-fascists in today’s climate.240   
What this suggests, of course, is guilt by association: if one user takes steps 
to amplify content posted by a bad actor, that person has become part of the 
 
similar posts being shared by different Pages “in a coordinated way” as evidence of inauthentic 
behavior.  Nathaniel Gleicher, Banning Twinmark Media Enterprises in the Philippines from Facebook, 
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Jan. 10, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/01/banning-
twinmark-media-enterprises/.  When different accounts work together to amplify content in these 
and other ways, they are flagged by Facebook as “networks of accounts” attempting to “mislead 
others about who they were and what they were doing.”  Gleicher, supra note 232.  
 236 Nick Statt, Facebook Bans Accounts Affiliated With Far-Right Group the Proud Boys and Founder Gavin 
McInnes, VERGE, (Oct. 30, 2018, 8:27 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/30/18045410/
facebook-bans-proud-boys-far-right-extremist-group-gavin-mcinnes (quoting a Facebook 
spokesperson as saying that Facebook not only bans hate groups and associated individuals, but 
also “remove[s] all praise and support when we become aware of it”). The company did not cite 
“coordinated inauthentic behavior” as the basis for the takedowns, but rather “violations of its rules 
on hate speech and the organizing of groups that spread hate both online and offline.”  Id. 
 237 Gleicher, Banning Twinmark Media Enterprises, supra note 235. 
 238 See Elias Groll, Anti-Racism Groups Feel Tarred by Facebook’s Fight Against Fake Accounts, FOREIGN POLICY 
(Aug. 1, 2018, 8:03 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/01/anti-racism-activists-furious-
facebook-smears-protest-with-russian-link/ (analyzing why Facebook deleted an account over an 
event that turned out to be real). 
 239 Id. 
 240 Smash Racism DC, A Statement from the Shut It Down Coalition on Facebook’s false “Russian Bot” censorship, 
FACEBOOK NOTES (July 31, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/notes/smash-racism-dc/a-state
ment-from-the-shut-it-down-dc-coalition-on-facebooks-false-russian-bot-ce/1310411682428767/. 
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“network.”  The First Amendment protects the right of association241; 
Facebook treats the wrong kinds of associations as evidence of prohibited 
inauthenticity.   
The shift to treating “inauthentic identity” as a behavior also signals a 
particular view about political persuasion.  In January 2019, Benjamin 
Decker, a research fellow at the Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and 
Public Policy, gave an interview to the Mercury News about Facebook’s 
removal of the accounts of five left-leaning technology experts.  Facebook 
had banned them for engaging in “coordinated inauthentic behavior” by 
creating a Facebook page with a conservative name.  Decker told journalists 
that “it was inauthentic and misleading for a left-leaning political operative 
to try to create communities of conservatives for the express purpose of 
sending those people political messages that would sway their thinking—and 
to use the label of a news organization to do so.”242  Of course it is misleading 
to claim to be a news organization if you’re not, but is it misleading to create 
a web page to appeal to your opponents in order to “sway their thinking,” if 
you acknowledge your real identity?   
4.  Authenticity as Attack Strategy 
Authenticity regulation has evolved into an effective means for one party 
to attack an opponent.  Most social media companies rely heavily on user 
reports of rule violations, including reports of “fake accounts.”  When a 
company receives a report that a user is publishing under a false identity, it 
is common for the company to demand that the user verify his or her identity.  
Unlike content-based attacks, which also occur but are limited to pieces of 
content, authenticity-based attacks are particularly potent.  They can result 
in the temporary suspension of a whole account until verification 
requirements are satisfied.  This sort of offensive strategy burdens the speech 
of the victim, even if he or she is operating under a “true” identity and is 
eventually exonerated.  Reports suggest that this kind of abusive tactic is 
common.243   
 
 241 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918–19 (1982) (holding that the First 
Amendment restricts the ability of the State to impose liability on an individual solely because of 
their association with another actor). 
 242 Tony Romm et al., Facebook Investigates Group Backed By Reid Hoffman, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 8, 2019, 
6:50 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/01/08/facebook-investigates-group-backed-by-
reid-hoffman/ (paraphrasing statements made by Decker). 
 243 See, e.g., Brett Solomon, What Can Social Media Platforms Do For Human Rights?, OPENDEMOCRACY 
(Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/what-can-social-media-platforms-do-for-
human-rights/ (“For years, people have been harassed on Facebook by adversaries who flag them 
as having ‘fake’ identities, even when they’re using their real names.”). 
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5.  Micro-Targeting and Discourse 
Micro-targeting itself, which is controlled and implemented with little 
outside scrutiny by private companies, raises alarms.  Although it seems 
reasonable for speakers to be able to direct their speech at a particular 
audience in a public way—for example, by taking out an advertisement in 
the Wall Street Journal or by running a commercial on a cable television 
network like the Food Network—it also seems unreasonable for social media 
companies to earn profits by charging fees to exclude short people, or people 
with diabetes, or men, from targeted political advertising.  Preliminary 
research has shown that Americans disapprove of advertisement targeting, 
and that individuals with lower incomes and lower educational attainment 
levels are less likely to notice it.244  So, micro-targeting can shape political 
discourse without recipients realizing that they are receiving very different 
speech from others.  And because some elements of micro-targeting involve 
black-box proprietary algorithms—not just choices exercised by speakers—
micro-targeting can provide companies with opportunities to engage in 
viewpoint discrimination.  It is not clear how this discrimination would ever 
become apparent to users or the public. 
Political advertisement transparency initiatives implemented to date—
such as the advertisement archive established by Facebook—do not provide 
information about micro-targeting, and as a result we lack good information 
about how social media companies and their clients are using micro-
targeting to shape debate.   
6.  The “Right and Privilege” to Evaluate Speech on Its Own Merit 
Citizens United v. FEC245 articulated the Court’s boldest-ever arguments 
opposing speaker-based discrimination and subsequent cases have continued 
to develop these themes.246  The Supreme Court reasoned that speaker-based 
 
 244 See Russell Heimlich, Internet Users Don’t Like Targeted Ads, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 13, 2012), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2012/03/13/internet-users-dont-like-targeted-ads/ 
(finding a majority of every demographic group dislike online targeted advertising). 
 245 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 246 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375–78, (2018) (finding that 
a disclosure law targeting licensed and unlicensed crisis pregnancy clinics was speaker-based); 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563–64 (2011) (holding that a Vermont law that engaged 
in content- and speaker-based discrimination violated the First Amendment); Ariz. Free Enter. 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 727–28 (2011) (holding that a “matching 
funds scheme” substantially burdened political speech and therefore violated the First 
Amendment); Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 871 (8th Cir. 
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discrimination harms both speakers and listeners.  It harms speakers by 
taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, infringing the 
speaker’s “right to use speech” to “strive to establish worth, standing, and 
respect for [its] voice.”247  It harms listeners because “the public” has “the 
right and privilege” to evaluate speech on its merits.248  “This Court’s 
precedents are deeply skeptical of laws that ‘distinguis[h] among different 
speakers, allowing speech by some but not others,’” the Court explained in a 
2018 case.249   
Authenticity rules prevent social media users from evaluating speech 
from “inauthentic” speakers on its merits.  Thus, during a period in which 
the Supreme Court has increased its hostility to speaker-based 
discrimination, private ordering by social media companies has moved in the 
opposite direction, evolving in favor of speaker-based strategies.  To the extent 
that the Supreme Court’s opposition to speaker-based discrimination is 
primarily grounded in suspicions about viewpoint discrimination or 
manipulation of public debate, these concerns extend to social media 
companies.250   
7.  Identity Theft and the State Apparatus 
The social media industry’s reliance on authenticity regulation has led to 
two related developments: an arms race between the industry and identity 
thieves, and a strong “mutuality of interest” between the industry and law 
 
2012) (discussing the Supreme Court’s disapproval of speaker-based discrimination in the context 
of political speech); see also Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610, 634 (Colo. 2010) (holding that a 
Colorado constitutional amendment prohibiting campaign donations from organizations receiving 
single-source government contracts did not sufficiently serve an important government interest and 
therefore, violated the First Amendment). 
 247 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–41. 
 248 Id.  Although the case concerned a speech ban, this part of the opinion bridged a connection to the 
argument, articulated in earlier Supreme Court opinions, that a speaker’s identity is irrelevant to 
an evaluation of his or her speech.  See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) 
(“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend 
upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”); see also Doe 
v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 238–39 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (applying Bellotti to referendum 
measures).  
 249 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378 (adding that “speaker-based laws run the risk that ‘the State has left 
unburdened those speakers whose messages are in accord with its own views.’”) (quoting Sorrell, 564 
U.S. at 580).   
 250 Michael Kagan, Speaker Discrimination: The Next Frontier of Free Speech, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 765, 767 
(2015) (“Citizens United should be understood as articulating and explaining a set of principles that 
have long been implicit in the case law.”). 
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enforcement.251  The industry’s choice to police speech through authenticity 
means that a user can get around its rules by stealing the identity of a real 
person.  That is, the skilled identity thief can avoid authenticity violations, 
which are not crimes, with real crime.  Since some identity thieves (say, 
Russian intelligence) are likely to be more technologically sophisticated than 
others (say, ordinary teenagers), the speakers who cause the most harm might 
not be the speakers who are easiest to catch.  Under a system of authenticity 
regulation, we might expect identity theft generally to increase and to grow 
more sophisticated, particularly in the lead-up to elections.  Notice, also, that 
as Facebook increases incentives for identity thieves to steal identities, the 
company makes its own identity-verification capabilities more valuable.252   
One problem with the authenticity approach is that it potentially locks 
companies into an arms-race with foreign state powers, which have a head-
start, vast resources, and technological prowess to evade detection.  Russia, 
like other foreign nations, has a significant intelligence apparatus developed 
over many decades.  Much spycraft is specifically geared toward hiding the 
identities of agents.  To fight back, companies have formed logical—perhaps 
necessary—alliances: they have joined forces with the U.S. Government.  
Through this public-private partnership, Facebook and other companies 
fight the “inauthenticity” of foreign spies, shoulder-to-shoulder with the 
Trump Administration.   
In August 2018, a sharp reporter asked Facebook executives how the 
company identified “bad actors” to remove from its platform.  It was an 
important question: How does Facebook determine that a user’s identity is 
“inauthentic,” justifying his or her removal?   
Facebook’s response suggested that the company has relied heavily on 
the U.S. Government to identify “bad actors.”  In reply, a Facebook 
executive seamlessly adopted the jargon of the U.S. intelligence community.  
“[T]hese assets,” he said, referring to the “bad actors,” “have been previously 
identified—not necessarily by us, but by intelligence services in the U.S.—as 
 
 251 ZUBOFF, supra note 10, at 19 (noting “mutuality of interests between fledgling surveillance capitalists 
and state intelligence agencies”). 
 252 It may be easier for identity thieves (e.g., Russian state-sponsored identity thieves) to steal the 
identities of Americans who are not Facebook users, and create new Facebook accounts for them.  
Facebook will likely have a harder time identifying that the person’s identity has been stolen, 
because Facebook has a lot less identifying information about non-users and because a non-user is 
less likely to notice that someone is posting on Facebook using his or her identity.  
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linked to Russian intelligence agencies.”253  In other words, in at least some 
cases, Facebook is taking the Government’s word for it.254  In 2019, Facebook 
said that it is “constantly” working to “stay ahead” of “bad actors” by 
“building better technology, hiring more people and working more closely 
with law enforcement, security experts and other companies” whose 
“collaboration was critical to [recent] investigations.”255   
Collaboration between the State and powerful social media companies 
raises censorship concerns and strengthens arguments that First Amendment 
law should treat Facebook and its competitors as “state actors.”256  Certainly, 
when facing off against Russian foreign intelligence services, it is helpful to 
have the U.S. intelligence community as an ally.  However, there is real 
danger that the Federal Government will use companies to suppress speech 
it does not like by labeling disfavored speakers as bad or inauthentic actors.257  
This is particularly effective where companies’ identity-verification systems 
 
 253 Press Call Transcript, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 21, 2018, 4:30 PM PST), 
https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/8-21-press-call-transcript.pdf (statement of 
Nathaniel Gleicher). 
 254 See also Gleicher, supra note 232 (stating that a January 2019 takedown of 107 Facebook Pages, 
Groups, and accounts, and forty-one Instagram accounts, was the result of “an initial tip from US 
law enforcement”). 
 255 Id.; see also Gleicher, supra note 234 (“On November 4 [2018], the FBI tipped us off about online 
activity that they believed was linked to foreign entities. Based on this tip, we quickly identified a 
set of accounts that appeared to be engaged in coordinated inauthentic behavior . . . . ”).  Another 
post further justified the company’s reliance on the State to identify targets for censorship, noting 
that “law enforcement agencies can draw connections off our platform to a degree that we simply 
can’t.”  Nathaniel Gleicher, How We Work with Our Partners to Combat Information Operations, 
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Nov. 13, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/11/last-weeks-
takedowns/.  The author explained that “[t]ips from government and law enforcement partners 
can therefore help our security teams attribute suspicious behavior to certain groups, make 
connections between actors, or proactively monitor for activity targeting people on Facebook.”  Id. 
 256 Major social media competitors, like Facebook and Twitter, have long admitted that they share 
information and work in unison to silence inauthentic speakers.  See, e.g., Testimony of Colin 
Stretch, supra note 2, at 3.  (stating that Facebook reaches out “to leaders in our industry and 
governments around the world to share information on bad actors and threats so that we can make 
sure they stay off all platforms”); Gleicher, How We Work With Our Partners to Combat Information 
Operations, supra note 255 (“[W]e’ve worked closely with our fellow tech companies, both bilaterally 
and as a collective, to deal with the threats we have all seen during and beyond elections.”); Tony 
Romm & Craig Timberg, Facebook Suspends ‘Inauthentic’ Iranian Accounts that Criticized Trump and Spread 
Divisive Political Messages, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2018/10/26/facebook-suspends-inauthentic-iranian-accounts-that-criticized-trump-s
pread-divisive-political-messages/ (“Twitter said it had removed a small number of accounts based 
on information Facebook supplied.”). 
 257 See, e.g., Press Call Transcript, supra note 253 (statement of Nathaniel Gleicher) (explaining, in answer 
to a reporter’s question, that Facebook had removed Pages of “bad actors” because “these assets 
have been previously identified—not necessarily by us, but by intelligence services in the U.S.—as 
linked to Russian intelligence agencies.”). 
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impose prior restraints on speech.  The possibility that authenticity 
regulation could be utilized by the Federal Government to suppress 
Americans’ speech should cause us to ask hard questions about its 
methods.258   
8.  Commodifying Identity 
By focusing regulatory enforcement on identity rather than content, the 
social media industry has turned an authentic digital identity into a valuable 
asset.  Already, it is a common practice for users to sell administrative rights 
to existing Pages on Facebook, an act that the company prohibits.259  In 
addition, a person can pay a proxy to communicate the person’s objectionable 
speech, using the proxy’s own authentic (or verified) identity.  Verification 
services and scams have proliferated online.260   
By commodifying approved identities, the social media industry has not 
solved problems caused by unapproved identities; it has merely created 
offline markets to exploit the authenticity rule systems.  One danger is that 
this will replicate the kinds of identity-nesting that have posed problems for 
years in other areas, such as tax evasion and campaign finance.  Another is 
that it will simply advantage wealthy speakers, who can leverage their 
resources to exploit loopholes in the system.   
* * * 
In the final analysis, the benefits of authenticity regulation for speech 
seem outweighed by the dangers they present to a range of important 
interests.  A main danger of any system of speech regulation, public or 
private, is that it grants the regulator unfettered power to silence viewpoints 
with which it disagrees.  As the foregoing makes clear, authenticity regulation 
creates opportunities for viewpoint discrimination, just like content 
 
 258 See, e.g., Michele Gilman & Rebecca Green, The Surveillance Gap: The Harms of Extreme Privacy and Data 
Marginalization, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 253, 257 (2018) (“Increasingly, large-scale data 
sharing between different levels of government and private industry blurs public/private 
distinctions.”). 
 259 See, e.g., Paige Occeñola & Geno Gonzales, PH Company Banned By Facebook Spread Lies, Used Fake 
Accounts, RAPPLER (Jan. 17, 2019, 1:57 PM), https://www.rappler.com/technology/social-
media/220741-facebook-remove-trending-news-portal-twinmark-media-enterprises (reporting 
that Twinmark Media Enterprises, an organization banned by Facebook in January 2019, “was 
selling admin rights to Facebook Pages it had created, in order to increase distribution and generate 
profit”). 
 260 See Taylor Lorenz, The Problem with Verification, ATLANTIC (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/06/instagram-and-twitter-should-elimin
ate-verification/592351/ (“Hundreds of people online advertise verification services. And some 
users have even been able to obtain a check mark after paying thousands of dollars.”). 
686 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:3 
moderation does.  It also invites law enforcement to participate in flagging 
inauthentic speakers.  However, unlike content moderation, authenticity 
regulation may obscure viewpoint discrimination when it happens.  What 
the public sees is a clever way to monetize data, or even a righteous purge of 
“bad actors.”  This is a danger that deserves serious consideration.   
CONCLUSION  
This Article has drawn close connections between authenticity regulation 
in the social media industry and the industry’s business imperatives.  
Authenticity rules provide social media companies with significant business 
value.  They facilitate companies’ analytics-based business models.  And, 
increasingly, they tap into a new speech ethos—which the companies 
themselves are largely responsible for popularizing—which treats 
authenticity as a moral virtue; as a behavior that can be policed; as a proxy 
for “authentic content”; and as a value analogous to human rights like 
privacy and dignity.  Authenticity, in the industry sense, has multi-
dimensional, evolving meanings.   
The use of authenticity regulation by social media companies deserves 
greater attention from the legal academy—not only its potential to 
incorporate bias, and its broader implications for identity, dignity, 
expression, and democratic discourse, but also its capacity to suppress 
viewpoints and shape information flows.  Today, Facebook removes more 
speech from its network for violations of its authenticity rules than for 
violations of its content-based rules, but with considerably less critical 
scrutiny by journalists and scholars, and with less transparency and oversight.  
Companies’ authenticity enforcement decisions are shared with other firms 
and become de facto industry-wide takedowns, and information obtained 
from users who agree to follow authenticity rules can be opportunistically 
shared with state actors, such as law enforcement.   
Is authenticity, as enforced by the social media industry, an essential 
speech value?  This Article argued that authenticity has some value for online 
speech, but mainly as a stand-in for truthfulness, which companies refuse to 
regulate.  As a (bizarre) result, under most companies’ rules, a social media 
user can lie about any subject but herself.   
 
